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14. ABSTRACT

The Department of Defense's (DoD) management of crisis augmentation forces in support of contingency operations, as executed through the Global Force Management (GFM) allocation system, is inadequately designed to manage risk and resources for non-standard capabilities requested by the Combatant Commands. These non-standard forces (e.g. ad hoc units and individual augmentees) represent the difference between the force currently constructed and the force currently requested to prosecute today's operations. Extant and survey-based sources describe how non-standard requirements increase risk to the force by degrading existing Service competencies and levying unknown or unpredictable risks to other standing global missions without meaningfully informing insight into accumulated risk. The thesis presents an hypothesis of how differing perspectives from process stakeholder staffs may obstruct fundamental process changes from being instituted, then concludes by demonstrating the timeless nature of these challenges in an historical context and provides a series of recommendations to address the described design seam.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Global force management, GFM, readiness, risk, service competency, force mismatch, request for forces, RFF, joint sourcing, joint manning document, JMD, individual augmentation/augmentee, ad hoc, in-lieu-of, hollow force, GFM Data Initiative, standard or non-standard force

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

MANAGING NON-STANDARD FORCE DEMANDS: RISK IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

by

James C. Wright

GS-14, Department of Defense

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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26 April 2012

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ABSTRACT

The Department of Defense's (DoD) management of crisis augmentation forces in support of contingency operations, as executed through the Global Force Management (GFM) allocation system, is inadequately designed to manage risk and resources for non-standard capabilities requested by the Combatant Commands (CCMD). These non-standard forces (*ad hoc* units and individual augmentees) represent the difference between the force currently constructed and the force currently requested to prosecute today's operations. Embedded within is a fundamental bureaucratic tension inherent in managing the trade-offs between programmed and un-resourced activities. Extant and survey-based sources describe how non-standard requirements, when processed through the existing allocation system, increase risk to the force by degrading existing Service competencies and levying unknown or unpredictable risks to other standing global missions without meaningfully informing insight into accumulated departmental risk. Based on the system's inability to meaningfully inform risk for this type of demand, the thesis draws on survey-based data to present a hypothesis of how differing perspectives from process stakeholder staffs may obstruct fundamental process changes from being instituted. Building on the survey of global DoD risk and perspectives from GFM practitioners, the thesis also contextualizes similar issues in a historical perspective, showing the timeless character of these challenges. Finally, the thesis presents a series of recommendations to address the described design seam.

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INTRODUCTION

> *While the Army remains the best led, best trained, and best equipped Army in the world, it is out of balance. The combined effects of an operational tempo that provides insufficient recovery time for personnel, families, and equipment – a focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities, and Reserve Component assigned missions for which they were not originally intended nor adequately resourced – result in our readiness being consumed as fast as we can build it.*[1]
>
> *-Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and General George W. Casey, Jr.*

In 2004, speaking at an Armed Forces town hall in Kuwait, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld responded to a soldier's question by noting that, "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."[2] This response quickly achieved infamy within the news and opinion media, less so for distilling a soldier's question into a statement on the timeless character of war planning, more so for matching many widely held perceptions of the Secretary, few of which were particularly flattering. Yet divorced from the immediate context of the question in 2004, his response is nevertheless apropos to the American experience over the past century of major military operations. In each case, the war fought was not the future war originally envisioned, whether on the basis of time, geography, predicates for hostility or the actual nature of the ensuing warfare. But consistently failing to correctly or precisely predict or plan for the future were not simply failures of vision, foresight or strategic acumen. Indeed, just as strategic miscalculations can invite unexpected responses and unanticipated futures, so too can the emergence of destabilizing technologies, shifting power balances, 'one-offs' or evolving interests render long-standing strategies or planning approaches ill-suited to the new security environment. In each of these

[1] Department of Army, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2008," Prepared and published by the Department of Army (Washington, DC, 2008).

[2] William Kristol. "The Defense Secretary We Have." Washington Post, December 15, 2004.

cases, the future challenges are fundamentally met, as Rumsfeld inelegantly pointed out, 'with the military we have, not the military we may wish to have' at that moment.

Even if we accept the fact that an impenetrable fog of unpredictability hinders one's ability to plan for the future, this is not in itself justification to approach the planning horizon passively. Instead, an unpredictable future argues for approaching the unknown with a resource and crisis decision model appropriately engineered to support the types of decisions inherent in these unplanned inflection points. Consequently, the management of the force—or, for example, how one bridges the immediate gap between the planned and programmed force in service and the force instead requested to fight the "Global War on Terror"—rises in significance once a nation finds itself in the next major war and the fog of unpredictable futures has momentarily cleared. At the core of this force management challenge is not simply a risk-based tradeoff between the emergent present and the still unknown future, but also a tradeoff within the present. For in anything short of a Clausewitzian formulation of "total war"[3] on a single front, there are existing strategic, operational and institutional tradeoffs that are embedded within any risk decision.

While the calculus of risk-based tradeoffs is applicable across all aspects of strategy, statecraft, planning and resourcing, this thesis will focus on the specific element of risk as it applies to the Department of Defense's (DoD) management of the United States (U.S.) Armed Forces during wartime or periods of large-scale, high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) activities.[4] Drawing on extant reports, Congressional testimonies and survey-based reserach, the thesis will

[3] Carl von Clausewitz. *On War*, (Princeton, NJ: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 83-84.

[4] The Congressional Research Service (CRS) defines 'high OPTEMPO' as a rate of unit utilization that "(causes) forces to lose their capacity to sustain operations and meet crises." See Michael C. Ryan. "Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much?" CRS, 98-41. Washington DC: CRS, January 14, 1998.

demonstrate that the risk inherent in the systemic mismatches between the planned force and the forces requested by combatant commands since 9/11 has been exacerbated by the force management decision model. This in itself represents an inability of the department to effectively manage risk between programmed activities and un-resourced activities. Examples of the effects from this include degradation to Service competencies, risk to future execution of numbered war plans, decreased readiness in warfighting units, 'broken' specialties, reduced 'phase zero' or baseline support to other geographic combatant commands or national agencies, as well as many other negative second and third order effects.

Still, given that the U.S. has been engaged in two large-scale operations in the Greater Middle East for the past decade, it is to be expected that there has been an accrual of risk within DoD. So while the thesis will deliberately present a foundational characterization of the types of risk currently being assumed across DoD, the analytic focus will be on demonstrating the causal linkage between non-standard wartime augmentation demands and those risk factors, then assessing whether the current force management process is appropriately designed to manage risk and resources for these non-standard demands and their attendant risks. That is, when confronted with an unpredicted war or an unfamiliar mode of warfare, how effectively does the current force management system inform risk decisions inherent within these inflection points?

Methodologically, the thesis begins by discussing the process whereby DoD resources contingency operations. This includes an examination of the current force management system, the rationale for establishing a new management model, the problems it was charged with correcting and the basic operating concept. The chapter provides a baseline definitional framework for key force management terms and concepts as well as detailing the allocation process and its interaction with other processes, including how requirements are managed and

resourced and engagement points by the key stakeholders, including the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Service representatives and combatant command headquarter staffs. Chapter one concludes by expanding on the procedural aspects of how DoD allocates forces, depicting the design seams through which the allocation system ineffectually addresses non-standard requests from combatant commands.

Chapter two describes the study methodology, beginning with the literature review as well as a detailed discussion of a survey that was developed specifically for this thesis. The chapter describes how extant sources and survey-based responses were used to establish or corroborate key assertions within the thesis and the analytic approach used in evaluating the data.

Chapter three then examines risk as it is manifest across the force, including broadly as it relates to allocation demands writ large, more specifically as it relates to non-standard demand. This chapter primarily relies on extant reporting or Congressional testimony that document either risk across the force or mismatches between the programmed force and the forces or capabilities requested by combatant commands. Together with the overview of the global force management (GFM) process, this serves as the foundational starting point in assessing the system and providing evidence of both force imbalances and elevated risk.

Having established the risk manifest across DoD and the fundamental mismatch between the Service inventories and wartime augmentation requests from the combatant commands, chapter four seeks to clarify, corroborate and ultimately demonstrate the relationship between risk, non-standard demand and the existing allocation process. Drawing on survey based responses, this chapter presents an analysis of responses and demonstrates a significant linkage between non-standard demand and risk, and how the current allocation process exacerbates or conceals that risk.

Chapter five then draws on historical evidence of the types of symptoms or remedies described in chapters three and four. Given the relative infancy of the current GFM system, the historical approach does not seek to find procedural or management-based similarities between past and present systems. Instead, drawing on these historical analogues, the similarities serve as an important reminder of the enduring challenge of adapting a 'planned force' with an 'unplanned or evolving' current fight, as well as the value in developing management models that minimize the inherent friction at these points. Chapter six offers a recommendation aimed at addressing the force management challenges identified through the previous chapters and chapter seven offers several final considerations.

Overall, the intent of this thesis is to demonstrate that a) the Department of Defense is accepting significant institutional and operational risk based on resourcing the current overseas contingency operations; b) risk is relatively definable and manageable for purely inventory-based units requested for these contingencies; c) demand not aligned with programmed structure constitutes a significant element of current demand; and d) the current force management process ineffectively characterizes institutional, operational and future risk for these non-programmed force allocation requests. The thesis demonstrates that the risk inherent in this friction point, while a reflection of the mismatch between 'the programmed force and the forces currently requested,' is both exacerbated and concealed by a process sub-optimized to manage force mismatches.

CHAPTER 1

Global Force Management 101

A related problem is the paralyzing complexity of Department of Defense processes.There are numerous systems of direction and oversight, and a variety of forums to guide the department's activities. Senior leaders have many opportunities for visibility and decision making, but their guidance is not well orchestrated across key issue sets, including strategy development, force management, force development, and business processes.[1]
- Invigorating Defense Governance: A Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 4 Report

Understanding the underlying framework to the global force management (GFM) system is critical to assessing its relation to departmental risk described in Chapter 3. This chapter summarizes the key aspects of that framework, beginning with the context under which GFM was first established, its specified purpose, governing authorities, applicability across the DoD, its deliberate procedures and finally the designated responsibilities within this process. As an initial term of reference, GFM as constituted in 2004 broadly refers to the DoD system that integrated the three existing processes known as force assignment, force apportionment and force allocation.[2] These three interrelated functions subsumed under GFM reflect different aspects to how the DoD comprehensively manages the force, though the most significant changes to the three processes were reflected within the management aspects of allocation. All three functions will be described later in this chapter, though the focus of the thesis is primarily on the allocation process, or the near-term management procedures whereby steady-state force distributions and mission prioritizations are adjusted in order to meet current crises and operations that were not otherwise adequately resourced or anticipated.

[1] Kathleen Hicks. "Invigorating Defense Governance: A Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 4 Report." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2008, Ch1, p4.

[2] Michael Santacroce. "Planning for Planners." September 2011. http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7d3f6744-b9c4-479b-9c8d-da2c132e368e/Planning-for-Planners_Jan_2012_new (accessed 15 February 2012), 32.

The GFM system was initially proposed under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, with the first formal steps towards implementation occurring in 2003.[3] This came at a time when the armed forces were already engaged in major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the flaws in the previous management model were becoming increasingly apparent. Prior to the implementation of this system, force management was conducted by the Joint Staff through a decentralized process that primarily involved the three combatant commands that held the preponderance of forces—U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Wargames hosted by the Joint Staff were frequently used to test force management recommendations and to identify approaches to mitigate risk assumed in these pending changes.[4] By 2003, this force management model proved ineffective on many levels, not least of which that force utilization post-9/11 was characterized by significant differences from the force utilization patterns over the previous decade as well as during the Cold War years. For one, the operational dictates of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan demanded a more timely decision cycle. In addition, prior to 9/11, there was significantly less aggregate stress on the force on the basis of force utilization. That is, force demands were low enough relative to available supply that inefficiencies and challenges inherent within that system, if not insignificant, were relatively easy to manage given the considerably lower levels of force demands or the shorter duration of those associated operations. Of equal importance, the nature of augmentation shifted post-9/11 in such a way that it re-emphasized the unique Title 10 roles of the Services in training, organizing and equipping forces in support of the combatant commands. Whereas in the past, an infantry

[3] Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. "Annual Report to the President and the Congress." Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 11, 2005, 34.

[4] Brigadier General Michael Ferriter and Jay Burdon. "The Success of Global Force Management and Joint Force Providing." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44 (1st Quarter 2007), 44-46.

battalion assigned to USEUCOM may have required minimal preparation and conversion activities prior to transferring to the Korean Peninsula, OIF and OEF instead introduced a multitude of non-standard missions with new or significantly altered essential tasks, unit compositions, training demands or equipment requirements. The 'losing' combatant commands were ill-suited to facilitate these conversions on large scales much less serve as the primary force 'owner' for the preponderance of military forces as they had under the previous system, and as such, the Service's critical Title 10 role of "training, organizing and equipping" the Force was reinforced within this new environment.

Based on these factors, Secretary Rumsfeld directed implementation of the GFM system as a means of shifting from the previous regional and threat based management system to an approach that enabled managing the Force from a more global and capabilities-based perspective.[5] Taking into account each of the three GFM functions, the new system was designed to provide "a decision framework for making assignment and allocation recommendations to [the] SecDef and apportionment recommendations to [the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. It also allows [the] SecDef to make proactive, risk informed force management decisions."[6]

Under the new allocation process, the Joint Staff maintained its overall management authorities for prioritizing operational or crisis demands, while one of three combatant commands assisted the Joint Staff by coordinating with the Services and other defense organizations to identify potential 'supply' from across the force as well as the associated risk for meeting these allocation requests.[7] The three combatant commands (CCMD) were USJFCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Transportation Command

[5] Department of Defense, Joint Staff J8, *Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI) Concept of Operations*, Written/prepared by LTC Ilean Keltz, Open-file report (April 16, 2007).

[6] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint Publication 5-0. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011.

[7] Ibid, 32.

(USTRANSCOM), with each assuming responsibility for conventional forces, special operations forces and strategic transportation assets, respectively. This framework was formalized on 25 June 2004 when Secretary Rumsfeld signed the Primary Joint Force Provider Implementing Memorandum.[8] The GFM system, far from a finished product, would be revised and adjusted over the years, including when USJFCOM was disestablished on 4 August 2011 and the Joint Force Provider responsibilities were transferred to a new directorate within the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J3).[9]

Conceptually, the allocation management approach of the GFM process implemented in 2004 provided a more comprehensive capability to accurately assess the impact of proposed changes in force assignment, but refinements, management system enhancements and staff re-alignments followed as DoD continually sought to improve the overall effectiveness of the new system. Perhaps the largest deficiency in the system as instituted in 2004 related to the relative immaturity of its information technology systems. In the beginning, force requests were not processed in standard formats, the Joint Staff and USJFCOM did not have a central data management system and the military departments lacked the level of consolidated and normalized unit and personnel data necessary for a centrally managed system within the Joint Staff.[10] To date, the former two issues have largely been resolved through systems like Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM), which serves as a clearinghouse for current and historical force requests as well as Service or combatant command input and SecDef orders. In terms of Service data, in spite of notable improvements and ongoing initiatives in this area, there

[8] Brigadier General Michael Ferriter and Jay Burdon. "The Success of Global Force Management and Joint Force Providing." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44 (1st Quarter 2007), 44-46.

[9] MC3 (SW/AW) Dominique J. Moore. "J3 transitions to Joint Staff." United States Joint Forces Command. August 1, 2011. http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2011/pa080111.html. (accessed 16 February 2011).

[10] Department of Defense, Joint Staff J8, *Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI) Concept of Operations*, Written/prepared by LTC Ilean Keltz, Open-file report (April 16, 2007).

still remain significant gaps in the availability of or access to current, decision-quality information at the unit and individual level.[11]

The legal basis for the broad force management authorities within the Department of Defense is largely based on Title 10 from the U.S. Code, though other Federal authorizations or laws like Title 50, Title 32 and the annual Defense Authorization Acts likewise provide controlling legal, statutory or resource authority.[12] This statutory guidance rests the preponderance of GFM decision-level authority with the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS maintains an advisory role,[13] the military departments train, organize and equip forces and the combatant commands operationally control these forces during peace and war to execute assigned missions.[14] Within the DoD, there are a series of documents which formally interpret and implement the statutory or legal authority from a force management perspective. These include the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and within the GEF, the Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM). These documents, all but the UCP signed by the Secretary of Defense, become the basis for how the Department of Defense is organized or can in-stride re-organize itself to meet specified or inferred direction from the Commander-in-Chief. The UCP, developed in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the

[11] See Service and Joint Staff discussion of this topic in Chapter 4.

[12] Christopher R. Paparone. "Why and How Department of Army Maintains Administrative Control Over the Operating Force." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, November 25, 2009. http://mrsi.usace.army.mil/Shared%20Documents/Heath/Student%20Material/F101/F101%20APPD%20DA%20control%20ops.pdf (accessed February 28, 2012).

[13] Michael Santacroce. "Planning for Planners." September 2011. http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7d3f6744-b9c4-479b-9c8d-da2c132e368e/Planning-for-Planners_Jan_2012_new (accessed 15 February 2012), 32-36.

[14] A notable exception to the CJCS's advisory role is in the Joint Staff's statutory role in nominating forces for apportionment against possible contingency operations. This will be briefly discussed later in the chapter, though it is important to distinguish the Secretary of Defense's directive authority with respect to assignments and allocations with the non-binding planning guidance that the CJCS can establish for apportionment.

Joint Staff, is signed by the President of the United States (POTUS). Temporary changes to the current organization or distribution of Forces are executed through allocation decisions, while potential force commitments to future contingency scenarios are planned through the apportionment process and permanent changes to the current organization of forces are executed through the assignment process. The assignment of forces, and by extension the consequent range of possible temporary changes that can be executed through the GFM system, is dependent upon which forces the Services have trained, organized and equipped. Force planning, sizing and shaping then encapsulate the foundation upon which the Department of Defense interprets and implements this higher guidance, creating in effect an inventory that can be managed by the GFM process. Figure 1 provides a notional overview of the force sizing and shaping process, depicting how the Department of Defense interprets relevant guidance, strategy and direction and then aligns and organizes its end-strength to best respond to this direction given the available resources and range of threats confronted.[15] The guidance and direction segment, comprised or influenced by a multitude of formalized processes, products or laws, sets the strategic direction for DoD, provides select policy guidance as to appropriate ways for meeting that strategic direction and then through defense authorization or supplemental funding bills appropriates the

[15] This and subsequent graphics characterizing the force management process represent an amalgamation of a series of references used extensively in this chapter, including Michael Santacroce's "Planning for Planners." In addition, Figure 1 also was derived based on: Paparone, Christopher R. "Why and How Department of Army Maintains Administrative Control Over the Operating Force." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, November 25, 2009. http://mrsi.usace.army.mil/Shared%20Documents/Heath/Student%20Material/F101/F101%20APPD%20DA%20control%20ops.pdf (accessed February 28, 2012).



Figure 1: Force Planning, Sizing, Shaping Simplified

resources to build a force consistent with that direction. Nested within this are DoD's own internal strategic guidance documents, including the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the UCP and the Defense Planning and Programming Guidance, among many others. These documents guide how the Military Departments will then recruit, train, organize, equip and provide their forces, whether in building new capabilities or commands (e.g. U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Cyber Command and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization), de-emphasizing or cancelling others (e.g. USJFCOM, U.S. Army's Future Combat System) or revising the organization or employment doctrine of existing units (e.g. Modularized Army Brigades, Air Expeditionary Force, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center Battalions). Critical within these calculations are developing the appropriate balance between the active and the reserve forces, with desired readiness levels based on anticipated advanced warning times, risk to security objectives and typical non-crisis utilization rates being key factors within this decision. Given the cross-flow between each of these segments within the notional force sizing and shaping processes, it is incorrect to treat this as a linear flow, though ultimately, the higher guidance informs what is required of the Department of Defense, how many resources

will be available to execute that strategy, and the military departments then recruit, organize, train and equip the force to meet those objectives. Importantly from a GFM perspective, this serves as the basis for not only initial force assignment decisions, but force allocation and apportionment possibilities as well.

The Secretary of Defense, through the authority of the POTUS and U.S. Code, is responsible for all decision authority relative to the assignment and allocations processes.[16] Assignment reflects the SecDef's implementation of POTUS direction by permanently placing units and other forces under the combatant command (COCOM) of the nine combatant commands within the Department of Defense. This assignment decision is directed through the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum (Forces For), which is published in the GFMIG. While the preponderance of forces are assigned through this process, the Military Departments retain a portion of their force for other directed missions (e.g. Service headquarter staff functions, institutional training requirements) or make personnel available for what are considered "unassigned" missions, which include manpower responsibilities ranging from the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Combat Support Agencies (e.g. Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency) and select missions that directly support CCMDs but are not directly assigned to them (e.g. some search and rescue functions, global communication support, etc.).

As distinguished from the permanent or steady-state nature of the assignment process, the allocation process then corresponds to operationally driven changes that are at least conceived of as time-bounded re-distributions of assigned forces. Allocation is then the process whereby the SecDef is able to:

[16]Michael Santacroce. "Planning for Planners." September 2011. http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7d3f6744-b9c4-479b-9c8d-da2c132e368e/Planning-for-Planners_Jan_2012_new (accessed 15 February 2012), 34.

> "…globally prioritize CCDR operational tasks, including war plan response posture, Security Cooperation and Partnership activities, or other missions as assigned by the CCDR—taking into consideration ongoing operations—and (redistributing) forces to satisfy these tasks. Prioritization of CCDR operational tasks and the assessment of risks are essential as global demand for annual forces may exceed available supply and consequently affect the Military Department's ability to sustain rotation rates or available forces/capabilities."[17]

While the Joint Staff, CCMDs and military departments play prominent roles in this process, the decision authority for allocating forces to a Combatant Command rests entirely with the SecDef.

Finally, apportionment is distinguished from allocation and assignment in that it is purely a planning activity focused on potential future contingencies and in that it lacks binding direction to the military departments or CCMDs. That is, based on Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 153, "the CJCS shall be responsible for preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by SecDef to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective."[18] In effect, based on the projected forces that will be assigned and allocated at that time, the CJCS develops a planning assessment of which forces *might* be available if specific contingency operations identified by the Secretary of Defense are executed in the future. Apportionment tables are included in the GFMIG and assist the Services and CCMDs to posture for these future contingencies, even if the precise forces identified in the tables were not ultimately available or in fact allocated.[19]

[17] Ibid, 102.

[18] Ibid, 109.

[19] Ibid, 32-35.



Figure 2: GFM Allocation Sourcing Process

As described above, these interrelated and interdependent policies, directives, statutes and processes form the context and framework under which allocations are requested, processed, decided and executed. Figure 2 describes the basic allocation request and decision process.[20] All allocation requests begin with an assessment by the originating combatant command that the command has inadequate assets, personnel or capabilities necessary to accomplish a directed task (e.g. Operation Iraqi Freedom). After confirming that there are inadequate forces already assigned or allocated to that CCMD, an allocation request in the form of either a Request for Forces (RFF) or a Joint Manning Document (JMD) is validated by the CCMD and submitted to the Joint Staff. In general, requests are either considered emergent or rotational, with emergent being newly assessed shortfalls, while rotational requests reflecting shortfalls that have carried-over from at least one previous rotation. RFFs typically focus on unit formations where there is an expectation by the gaining CCMD that the unit members are trained, organized and equipped

[20] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning.* Joint Publication 5-0. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, Appendix H, page H-2.

to operate as a unit, while JMDs typically correspond to Joint Task Force Headquarters, where individual members will assemble at the deployed location from multiple locations or sources, not having trained together collectively prior to deployment.[21] Per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01D, personnel requests levied through this process are neither planned nor programmed for within Service end-strength, meaning that unless the Service was over-strength at the time or solely used reserve component personnel,[22] there is an implied gap of one of the permanent Service billets across DoD.

After the CCMD submits the RFF or JMD, that request is validated on the Joint Staff, and then staffed with all potential force providers. During this process, force providers study sourcing capacity, risk is identified and sourcing options are presented to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff J3 Operations Directorate receives the sourcing nomination and then makes a final sourcing recommendation to the SecDef. This recommendation could reflect fully sourcing the request, partially sourcing it or not sourcing it. The SecDef finally receives this recommendation during the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) process, and makes a decision based on the recommendation and identified risk. This order is then reflected in a GFM Allocation Plan (GFMAP) or GFMAP modification, which carries the authority of a SecDef order.[23] The tasked organization or command then organizes, prepares and deploys the personnel, units or capabilities based on the timetable established in the SecDef GFMAP.

While there is an administrative bifurcation between RFFs and JMDs, there is deep overlap between the nature of personnel or capabilities requested through both processes based

[21] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Language and Regional Expertise Planning.* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3126.01. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 27, 2010, C-4.

[22] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01D. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 12, 2011.

[23] Michael Santacroce. "Planning for Planners." September 2011. http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7d3f6744-b9c4-479b-9c8d-da2c132e368e/Planning-for-Planners_Jan_2012_new (accessed 15 February 2012), 101.

on both drawing from the same, broad DoD force pool. As such, the more instructive distinction is between standard or non-standard requests, which was described in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.[24] Standard requests refer to unit formations that exist within the Service inventories that were specifically designed to carry-out warfighting tasks, carry a military table of organization and equipment and are doctrinally trained to support CCMD missions through the performance of these tasks. Conversely, non-standard requests relate to a variety of *ad hoc* formations or personnel requirements that are not otherwise planned and programmed for by the Military Departments. Non-standard requests exist within the RFF realm and as a definitional matter, constitute the majority of JMD requests.

In practice, Figure 3 describes how standard requests are processed and resourced relative to Service end strength. In general, each Service trains and organizes an operational force with the purpose of meeting DoD's operational requirements. This serves as the core pool from which a Service provides forces to CCMDs. In this notional depiction that is simplified in order to illustrate key concepts, a Service created an operating force with nine separate and identical units, each with five personnel. Given an assumed policy of one deployment for every three years (reflected in the "1:2 Dwell" ratio notation), this Service could generate as many as three units to meet a CCMD's allocation demand ("Available to Deploy"). In the graphic, "dwell" refers to the policy-derived period of time between anticipated or ordered deployments. As an important distinction, this depiction envisions the CCMD only making standard force requests and assumes essentially full manning in the Active and Reserve force, thereby allowing for the Service to fully meet both potential operational deployments as well as all other standing force obligations (e.g. fully manning the HQ staff at USAFRICOM, the training base and the Combat

[24] U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands.* GAO-08-670. Washington DC: GAO, May 2008, 7-8.



Figure 3: Managing Standard Force Requests through GFM

Support Agencies). Through this model, additional units could be generated either by drawing from the reserve force, or by revising the dwell policy (e.g. shortening the duration between deployments).

Nevertheless, as demonstrated by OIF and OEF, not all requests from CCMDs have been for standard forces. Figure 4 includes a notional depiction of the same Service, this time obligated through the GFM allocation process to resource both standard and non-standard missions. Circular 'units' as depicted within the end-strength continue to provide the same force generation possibilities (one deployment in every cycle of 3 segments), yet in this case, non-standard requests (see non-circular shapes identified by an asterisk) now would appear to compel the Services to seek alternative sources for meeting that non-standard demand. The manner and



Figure 4: Managing Non-Standard Force Requests through GFM

scale in which individual Services draw from other areas of their entire force in order to resource current operations differs markedly, though each of the phenomena detailed in the graphic reflects symptoms highlighted in chapters three and four. For example, in order to fill the leadership-heavy responsibilities of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, this Service may draw from units that are already tasked to deploy (see gaps in "Prepare to Deploy/Reset" section of Figure 4). Or, the Service may decrement other Combatant Command or Combat Support Agency manning requirements, rarely with non-Service organizations being identified during the allocation decision-making process as directly or indirectly being the source of the Service manpower. While the reserve utilization approach on the surface appears to bear the lowest discernable costs (i.e. reserve units or personnel generally are not otherwise engaged in standing DoD missions), the manner in which Services draw from the Reserves often results in cannibalized units that are no longer 'ready' for future use.[25]

[25] See discussion in Chapter 4, including pages 64-65.

In summary, this model notionally depicts the process whereby Services are currently meeting today's elevated wartime demands. Importantly, the Service force development process is designed to resource permanent manning responsibilities across DoD while concurrently generating doctrinally standardized forces to meet wartime demands. Nevertheless, as shown with the design seam depicted in Figure 4, non-standard demand obligates the Services to draw from other missions across DoD, particularly when the demand is high for the operating force, or the grades and skills requisite in the non-standard demand simply do not exist in the operating force. As detailed in subsequent chapters, evidence of these types of decrements based on wartime augmentation demands are common across the force and their existence bears out this conceptual model for how non-standard demand is resourced by the Services. Further, that DoD leadership has incomplete visibility into the impact of these decrements demonstrates the inadequacy of the current allocation system to characterize risk within a force management model so organized. Following a brief introduction into the study methodology, chapter three and four will provide evidence to the types of risk described above as well as the incomplete departmental visibility into that risk, then establish a causal linkage between non-standard demand and that risk.

CHAPTER 2

Study Methodology

Developing and publishing a thesis that addresses any form of risk across the Department of Defense (DoD) is in itself problematic from a methodological perspective in that authoritative risk data, especially in consolidated form, exists primarily in classified channels. In addition, drawing on extant research, data and assessments of the global force management (GFM) system presents equal challenges, in part based on the classified nature of many elements of the GFM process, but also based on the relative infancy of the GFM system. Given the frequent process changes within the GFM system since its inception in 2004 and the high force utilization demands over the same period, it is difficult to establish a consistent control group from which the GFM system could be assessed on process factors alone. That is, absent a long enough string of year-data that includes various rates of force utilization relative to consistent GFM procedures, conclusions can be disproportionately skewed by outliers, policy decision or the unknown effects of GFM procedural variance. Understanding the impact of each of these factors is particularly important in assessing how much risk within the system is based on the actual process, or how much is based on the underlying policy (i.e. policy decision X assumed an elevated level of risk that was largely independent to any procedural consideration). Nevertheless, there exists significant data in open sources or through other collection approaches that can inform many of the underlying questions of risk and force utilization. Yet the challenge, which ultimately informed the methodological approach taken in chapters three through five, is the contextualization of this data relative to force management decisions and from this, the

demonstration of causal linkages to support the thesis that the GFM allocation process is inadequately designed to manage risk and resources for non-standard augmentation demand.

As a starting point, the study methodology was constructed in such a way as to draw on publically available sources in order to provide a foundational and formally recognized characterization of DoD risk and force utilization patterns over the past decade. Recognizing the inadequacy of these extant sources by themselves in proving the core assertions of the thesis, a survey was developed to more deeply examine force utilizations patterns, risk and in particular, describe the relationship between non-standard force demands and the risk factors introduced through the extant sources. The most critical purpose of the survey was to either corroborate or establish a causal linkage between non-standard demand, risk and the allocation process.

Following this basic approach, chapter three marshals extant reporting to establish a foundational characterization of risk and force utilization patterns. The principal component to this was a literature review and the majority of sources were identified through the Defense Technical Information Center's (DTIC) online search engine as well as Congressional resources, including ProQuest Congressional and Congressional committee homepages. A third source included Google.com's general and academic online search engines. Word searches focused on terms or expressions that relate to global force management, operational utilization and risk, with key search terms included in Figure 5. Although the majority of the sources identified through this research presented

- (Global) force management
- Readiness
- Risk
- Operations
- Iraq or Afghanistan
- Service competency
- Force mismatch
- Request for Forces (RFF)
- (Joint) Sourcing
- Individual augmentation/augmentee
- Ad hoc
- In lieu of
- Hollow force
- GFM Data Initiative
- Standard or Non-Standard Force

Figure 5: Key search terms

qualitative assessments, many of the reports either drew on independently developed quantitative data or DoD statistical information.

In order to enhance information about the GFM system and DoD risk from extant reporting or Congressional testimony as well as attempt to establish causal linkages, a survey specifically designed for this thesis was conducted. Thesis development was enhanced by the author's seven years of experience working in the GFM system, primarily as a staff officer supporting the Joint Staff beginning in 2004. The overall research approach was designed to draw on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data.

The survey was based on the themes identified in the literature review concerning GFM and the military force. The survey's general intent was to amplify on, corroborate or challenge information contained in the extant publications or testimonies by drawing on the unique experiences of a cadre of current or former GFM practitioners. Questions developed for the survey were reviewed by external content area experts as well as methodologists within National Defense University's (NDU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) staff. Questions for each section (J1, J3 or Service) included a mix of text-based responses as well as metric-based assessments. While most questions were not identical across each group, the questions were developed in such a way as to allow for comparison across groups based on the topic. NDU's IRB staff approved the survey design on November 8, 2011.

Following the approval by the IRB, an initial core of potential survey participants was identified based on the author's previous professional contact with each. Participants were all U.S. Government employees or members of the Armed Forces and each had current or recent experience at the field grade level (military grades O-4 through O-6 or U.S. Government civilians GS-13 through GS-15) directly working in the Global Force Management system.

These participants were also 'binned' into three distinct groups that represent key aspects of the management and provision responsibilities within the GFM system. Management representatives were grouped according to experience as Joint Staff or U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Operations Directorate (J3) staff members or Personnel Directorate (J1) staff members. The Joint Staff J3 Directorate tends to focus on unit-based allocation requests, though is the staff lead for managing or "coordinating" all individual and unit-based requests, with the exception of special operations forces and mobility assets.[1] The Joint Staff J1 supports the J3 in its overall responsibilities, with its efforts focused towards purely individual-based requests. The force provision component of the GFM process was addressed through the survey by members from each of the four Armed Services, with these personnel having experience on either Service Headquarter Staffs or in the Service components previously subordinate in command to USJFCOM (e.g. U.S. Air Force's Air Combat Command, U.S. Marine Forces Command). As 'force providers,' the Services are responsible for providing forces or personnel to match both unit-based and individual requests generated by the combatant commands. Given the focus of the thesis on risk as it is represented during the allocation decision process, I specifically elected to not include representatives from combatant commands in the survey, instead using extant reporting to address this area. Nevertheless, a more intensive assessment of risk as it manifests itself operationally with combatant commands—both in those receiving forces and those losing forces—would be an important addition to an overall understanding of comprehensive departmental risk as it relates to the GFM process.

The survey was then distributed to this core group of GFM practitioners via e-mail. Respondents were each asked to identify other prospective individuals based on demonstrated

[1] Michael Santacroce. "Planning for Planners." September 2011. http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7d3f6744-b9c4-479b-9c8d-da2c132e368e/Planning-for-Planners_Jan_2012_new (accessed 15 February 2012), 101.

expertise in the area of GFM. Of the 15 total survey participants, two were directly identified by the author, with the remaining (13) being either independently referred by others or being identified by others as well as the author. One participant also contributed to two sections (Service and J3), given his extensive experience in GFM working both aspects of the GFM allocation process. The survey recruitment letter is included in Appendix A and the survey is included in Appendix B.

The survey was released on November 8, 2011 and participants were asked to respond by December 9, 2011. Follow-up e-mails were sent to participants if they had not yet responded or if there were questions related to their initial responses. For data collection, a spreadsheet was developed to track participants and to catalogue all answers, whether text-based or metrically scored. In order to ensure the anonymity of each participant, members were also assigned numerical identifiers based on their section. Of the 16 separate responses (including one responding to two different categories based on that officers experience in multiple offices), seven represented military Service equities, including at least one from each Service. Within the management aspect of GFM, three of the respondents represented Joint staff J1 Personnel Directorate and six respondents represented the J3 Operations Directorate.

In order to analyze the responses, pivot tables in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet were used to track and assess trends within metric-based responses and the filter options were used to sort questions by relevant groupings. Metrics-based responses were used for both quantitative analysis as well as a means of quantifying group perceptions towards key risk and process questions. For text-based responses in chapter four, unless otherwise noted, responses were selected that were qualitatively or quantitatively representative of their core group. With respect to survey findings, the key empirical emphasis was on corroborating or amplifying data found in

extant sources and the key analytical focus was a comparative assessment of organizational perspectives and how these might inform broader questions related to process effectiveness.

Finally, for chapter five I used an historical approach that drew parallels between risk and force utilization factors identified in chapters three and four with similar phenomena seen primarily over the past century. These historical analogues helped to contextualize the symptoms of risk we see today and show how similar problems were responded to in previous times. The basic approach used for this chapter was to identify key symptoms, risks or remedies seen over the past decade and then through a survey of historical reporting and literature, demonstrate congruence between the separate eras.

CHAPTER 3

The State of the Force

> *We must have a trained and properly equipped force ready to handle whatever comes, but my strong concern is that our readiness shortfalls and the limitations on our ability to deploy trained and ready ground forces have reached a point where these services would have a very steep uphill climb with increased casualties to respond effectively to an emergency contingency.*[1]
>
> *-Honorable Ike Skelton*

Concluding that the Department of Defense's (DoD) force management process is inadequately designed to manage risk and resources for contingency-based allocation requests is dependent on identifying signs of unknown, unforeseen or otherwise inadvisable risk being assumed and then demonstrating a linkage between the process and that risk. The purpose of this chapter is to define risk, identify documented signs of risk in and across the force, and examine whether these risks are merely temporary challenges. By doing so, this chapter lays a foundation for beginning to demonstrate linkages between identified risks and the GFM allocation process.

What is Risk?

Assessing the meaning of risk is predicated upon understanding its two principal components—probability and severity.[2] These factors are then further impacted by the actual consequences. That is, in the end, the notion of 'assuming risk' has little practical meaning if there was not an unwelcome outcome after all. For example, not buying a gift on your anniversary may assume a high degree of risk, but if your spouse forgets that it was your anniversary, there was no practical impact. No organization intentionally engages in higher-risk behavior than is necessary, and as a corollary to this, once an unacceptable level of risk is

[1] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces.* 110 Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008.

[2] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint Publication 5-0. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, IV-11.

identified, organizations tend to seek remedies or otherwise mitigate the acknowledged risk. While this chapter catalogues a wide variety of risk currently being assumed by DoD—both theoretic based on unpredictable futures or realized—the purpose of highlighting it is not to draw attention to it for the discrete remedies that may have been employed to mitigate its unacceptable elements. An assumption of this thesis is that like any rational organization, DoD will actively deal with unacceptable risk as it is identified, irrespective of the procedural exigencies which may have contributed to creating the risk in the first place or may otherwise serve as an impediment to comprehensively addressing it. But not being able to effectively assess the aggregate value of risk currently being assumed will prevent organizations from altering decisions that can lead to these inadvisable and actual consequences. This point is central to both the chapter and the thesis.

DoD describes risk in four categories: operational, force management, institutional and future challenges.[3] Nevertheless, as a framework for discussing risk, this thesis uses a variation of those in order to focus on the first two while highlighting specific aspects of each that, based on the DoD risk definitions, would otherwise overlap between multiple categories. The three categories of risk described in this chapter are: institutional, operational and potential contingencies. Institutional factors include risk to core Service doctrinal competencies, training and other issues related to the overall health of the force. The operational category includes force readiness and risk to supported commands executing DoD operations or other activities. Finally, potential contingencies includes risk as it relates to the DoD's ability to concurrently support additional possible contingency operations globally. Operational risk described in this chapter

[3] Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.* Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington DC: February 2010, 90.

predominantly relates to risk that is actively being assumed, while institutional and potential contingency risk reflects a mix between current and either unrealized or poorly understood risk.

Institutional Risk

Post 9/11, broad institutional risk factors were identified as early as the initial year of operations in Iraq, with the principal causes considered to be either high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) or the scale of missions executed outside a Service's core competencies.[4] The so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT)[5] not only elevated the OPTEMPO of the force, but it introduced a series of non-standard missions and tasks that range from modest variations to large deviations from the core individual and unit based competencies that the military departments otherwise use to plan, program and doctrinally orient their forces to meet tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Importantly, combatant commands (CCMD) rely on these designated competencies for both executing current missions and developing plans for potential contingencies. OPTEMPO in and of itself provides a unique stress on the force in terms of equipment and individual factors, though also in exacerbating the aggregate strain of non-standard mission utilization. That is, compressed timelines between deployments based on a high OPTEMPO allows for less time to train for Service or individual competencies, leaving only time to train for non-standard or geographically-narrow mission sets.

The phenomenon of degraded competencies was recently addressed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR): "Although we have always retained sufficient capacity and capability to address the entire spectrum of threats,

[4] General Robert Magnus. *The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces.* Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee of the 110 Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008, 7.

[5] The term "Global War on Terror" was officially retired by the Department of Defense in 2009 and replaced by the term "Overseas Contingency Operation" or "OCO." Nevertheless, given that the formulation of GWOT applied to the preponderance of the period from which research was drawn for this thesis, the term GWOT will be used throughout this thesis vice the less descriptive and less well-known expression of "OCO."

an aggressive and sustained tempo of operations has necessitated prioritizing training and readiness for current missions over other types of operations."[6] Services have echoed this sentiment, including the U.S. Army's Brigadier General David Halverson testifying before Congress that due to the inherently perishable nature of training skills, "…a degree of core mission atrophy occurs, and consequently the unit temporarily becomes less capable of performing its core missions."[7] The high OPTEMPO over the past decade has impacted other aspects of training, as well. In the Army, soldiers have either graduated early from required professional military education or were delayed from attending these programs in order to complete training with deploying units.[8] The Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), General Robert Magnus, testified how training for the unique terrains of Iraq and Afghanistan has left the USMC unprepared for other environments:

> "Contributing to the stress on our force is the short dwell time between deployments and our intense focus on counterinsurgency operations. The short dwell time at home does not allow our units the time to train to the full spectrum of missions needed to be ready for other contingencies. This most directly affects your Marines' proficiency and core competencies, such as, combined arms and amphibious operations… The focus on counterinsurgency diminishes the time available for combined-arms training—artillery, firing your tank tables, working with close air support—that we did before… [meaning] that we have a generation of company-grade officers now who studied about amphibious operations in the basics school and in some cases never set foot on a ship."[9]

Operational Risk

Operational risk is manifest in many forms, beginning with personnel and forces allocated to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to prosecute Operations Iraqi Freedom

[6] Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.* Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington DC: February 2010.

[7] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Use of In Lieu of, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.* 110 Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 2007, 84.

[8] Ibid, 84.

[9] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces.* 110 Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008, 7, 31.

(OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). While risk in these cases exists with commands receiving allocated forces, it is minimized on the basis of the Services retraining or converting Service-members to most effectively operate in these environments. That is, operational proficiency performing a mission distinct from the individual or unit's planned or programmed purpose by definition must come at the expense of the original competencies. USCENTCOM's Deputy Director for Operations (J3) Brigadier General Jack Egginton testified to the broad success of re-training efforts, even as limited problems persisted.[10] These included modest numbers of deployed Service personnel arriving in theater without the appropriate training.

More broadly, operational risk is not simply restricted to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and in fact is documented extensively with other global missions and DoD functions. In 2008, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Admiral Timothy Keating noted that 30,000 of his ground forces were in the Middle East rather than available for USPACOM mission sets.[11] Statistics paint a striking picture of this effect in the critical Special Operations community, where, according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen in 2008, over 80 percent of Special Operations Forces (SOF) were deployed to the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).[12] This weight of effort, while reflecting an explicit emphasis by DoD on the priority efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, nevertheless comes at the cost of other activities. As Admiral Mullen added, "…there's a lot of Special Forces work

[10] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Use of In Lieu of, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.* 110 Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 2007, 4, 18.

[11] Bryan Bender. "Fewer Pacific Forces Ready to Respond." Boston Globe. February 27, 2008. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/02/27/fewer_pacific_forces_ready_to_respond/?page=full (accessed Feb 19, 2012).

[12] Ibid.

that they've been doing for years in other parts of the world that just isn't getting done (now)… That builds risk over time, and we have to assess that."[13]

Even as the OPTEMPO on the force has been high for the past decade, it also has had a disparate impact across different communities. Skills and competencies required in the GWOT do not perfectly correspond to the planned and programmed force, and as such, some communities or specialties have an increased OPTEMPO relative to others. Other communities are impacted, less in terms of OPTEMPO, more in terms of re-training outside their core areas, which are relatively less valuable in conflict emphasizing counterinsurgency or counterterrorism capabilities. Characteristic of this are the second-order effects of the high OPTEMPO within the SOF community, which has primarily shifted its weight of effort towards counterterrorism operations in the decade following 9/11. Consequently, security force assistance, a foundation to preventive activities and a core task of the SOF community, is now regularly performed by general purpose forces, or essentially conventional forces that have been temporarily re-trained to perform these (in their case) non-standard missions.[14]

Persistent shortfalls, frequently referred to as "high-demand/low-density" (HD/LD) assets, have been described in testimony by the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs as civil affairs, intelligence, cyber, special forces and military police.[15] These are capabilities or skill areas where the existing demand exceeds what is available in the programmed force. Far from a limited number, official manpower data in 2009 identified 240

[13] Ibid.

[14] John Nagl. "Defense in an Age of Austerity: Alternative Affordable DoD Force Structures." Moderated talk transcribed by Federal News Service. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 2011. http://csis.org/files/attachments/110929_panel4_transcript.pdf (accessed February 19, 2012).

[15] Honorable Dennis M. McCarthy "DoD Focus on Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Programs." Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington DC: U.S. Senate, May 4, 2011. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/McCarthy%2005-04-11.pdf (accessed February 19, 2012).

occupations where "heavy deployments continued to deplete the pool of Service members who can be ordered to deploy in compliance with the Secretary's targets" for gaps between deployments, one of the most direct indicators of high OPTEMPO.[16] While the operational dictates driving these elevated demands over the past decade—primarily counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations—will adjust relative to U.S. policy and future commitments to these types of activities, there is reason to believe that overall demand for each will not recede to pre-9/11 levels. As testified in 2011, many of these capabilities "…have been in high demand over the past 10 years, and all indications suggest they will continue to be in high demand in the future with Security Cooperation/Building Partner Capacity potentially moving to the forefront of Department missions."[17] The consequence of this applies to not only the impacted career fields, but to other career fields that will continue to be drawn from to compensate for near-term shortfalls. In essence, this operational risk is then manifest in parallel to the institutional risk associated with managing an imbalanced force.

The units, individuals and capabilities most closely associated with an HD/LD demand profile then generate commensurate impacts with the commands or organizations where they would otherwise serve globally. As an Army officer serving as an executive officer in a civil affairs unit stated, "You're either there [USCENTCOM], you just got home, or you're getting

[16] David R. Graham, et al. "Self-Selection as a Tool for Managing the Demands on Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel." Conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under contract for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness). Alexandria, VA: IDA, November 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA540829 (accessed February 19, 2012).

[17] Honorable Dennis M. McCarthy. "DoD Focus on Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Programs." Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington DC: U.S. Senate, May 4, 2011. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/McCarthy%2005-04-11.pdf (accessed February 19, 2012).

ready to go."[18] Impacts are in part institutional given the degraded regional specializations like language skills, with other risk related to the other global missions. Emblematic of the challenges of understanding the impact of risk at the micro and macro level occurred during Operation Unified Assistance, a tsunami relief effort executed by USPACOM beginning in December 2004:

> "During this relief effort, the 96th [Civil Affairs Battalion] could muster only 18 Soldiers for the operation out of an authorized strength of 48. The shortage was due to recurrent deployments and augmentation of civil affairs companies attached to USCENTCOM for operations in Iraq. This lack of rapid reaction civil affairs capability forced (us) to request Reserve Component forces, which were already stretched to the breaking point. If the entire 96th had been available, a strong capability could have been established in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Requested Reserve forces were not used because the Secretary of Defense decided not to leave any U.S. forces in the affected countries after the initial relief effort was complete. Furthermore, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion can rarely field more than 2 civil affairs teams per quarter to assist with the entire USPACOM area of responsibility, which consists of 43 countries, 20 territories and possessions, and 10 American territories. When those teams are in-theater, they are focused exclusively on the USPACOM commander's priority in regard to the war on terror, leaving no capability for additional theater engagement. Instead, these teams should have the focus of an entire battalion, with 4 companies and 20 civil affairs teams for regular use and rotation in-theater in support of the commander. Additionally, included in the USPACOM Theater are Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries that receive scant civil affairs support to shape the environment and build host-nation capacity to combat terrorism."[19]

Bridging the purely operational from future contingency risk factors is readiness, as it can reflect both inadequacies in meeting current operational requirements as well as a force and defense posture that is unlikely capable of effectively responding to a range of future contingencies. In either case, the central and in effect unanswerable question remains, 'ready for what?' As discussed previously, risk that is never manifest is simply theoretic, while risk that is

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[18] Colonel William R. Florig. "Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers: A Force at Risk." *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Issue 43 (4th Quarter 2006). http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume5/may_2007/5_07_2.html (accessed February 19, 2012).

[19] Ibid.

realized is expressed in operational terms. In addition, the best or worst of preparations and readiness calculations may still fail to effectively prepare U.S. forces for first contact with the enemy. Historically, American forces have frequently not succeeded in the first engagements of longer wars (e.g. the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Union Army taking over one-year to win a major battle, the battle at Kasserine Pass during World War II, Task Force Smith in Korea, etc.).[20] Still, readiness is an important indicator in defense planning, for even at the theoretic extreme, these assessments serve as critical management or decision aids in balancing risk and resource portfolios. On that count, readiness assessments have suffered since 9/11. The General Accounting Office found in a 2008 the "extended operations in Iraq and elsewhere have had significant consequences for military readiness, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps."[21] The Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Philip Breedlove testified in 2011 that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) has been in a "…slow but steady decline in reported unit-ready indicators," with some elements of the USAF right at the "ragged edge."[22] The Chief of Naval Operations reiterated the same, stating that while overall readiness in the Navy was "acceptable," the increased operational deployments have impacted training time. Consequently, "the stress on the force is real… and it has been relentless."[23]

The natural priority of ensuring the highest readiness levels for deploying units has led to the cannibalization of the force in order to ensure these units are ready for deployment. As

[20] James L. George. "Is Readiness Overrated? Implications for a Tiered Readiness Force Structure." *Policy Analysis*, Number 342. Washington DC: CATO Institute, April 29, 1999. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa342.pdf (accessed February 19, 2012).

[21] Sharon L. Pickup. *Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to Rebuilt Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces.* Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and testimony provided to the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. GAO-08-497T. Washington DC: GAO, February 14, 2008.

[22] Hugh Lessig. "Military brass warns against deep cuts." Daily Press. July 26, 2011. http://articles.dailypress.com/2011-07-26/news/dp-nws-forbes-military-hearing-20110726_1_spending-cuts-debt-debate-readiness (accessed February 19, 2012).

[23] Ibid.

testified before Congress by the U.S. Army's Vice Chief of Staff General Peter Chiarelli, "[o]ver time, the Army… has directed resources away from non-deployable Operational Forces and [the] Generating Force to support… forces deployed. The result is increased strategic risk in the Army's ability to respond to unforeseen contingencies."[24] Yet managing the force as a just-in-time supply chain has not been without additional challenges, as the Army has still transferred personnel into or out of units following critical pre-deployment mission rehearsal exercises. The current Army planning guidance is for all Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) or [Combat Aviation Brigades] to have a minimum of 90 percent of billet authorizations filled at least 45-days prior to the mission rehearsal.[25] As testified General Chiarelli though, "…due to sustained demand, Army units are achieving this deployment readiness closer and closer to their arrival dates in theater. This creates operational risk by reducing the near-term flexibility for adapting to mission driven adjustments to arrival dates or other requirements."[26] Filling HD/LD skills and grades within this planning guidance has been particularly difficult. Reflective of the broad challenges in meeting this planning guidance, only 11 of the 13 BCTs deployed to the USCENTCOM Area of Operations met the 90 percent deployed strength by their designated arrival date. The final two did not reach 90-percent manning until approximately 30-days after arriving in theater.[27]

Potential Contingency Risk

In terms of potential future contingencies, the readiness assessments paint a bleak picture. During Congressional testimony in 2010, it was noted that "The Army currently has limited

[24] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *The Current Readiness of the U.S. Forces.* 111 Cong., 2nd sess., April 14, 2010.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

capacity to respond to unforeseen contingencies."[28] This assessment built on earlier ones, including in 2008, when it was assessed that by spring of that year, all four brigades of the 82nd Airborne, the Army's rapid response division, would be deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, leaving the Army without "a rapid response capability for other crises around the globe."[29] Two year earlier, speaking for the posture of the entire U.S. Armed Forces, the CJCS General Peter Pace assessed that, if drawn into another crisis, the U.S. military would not be able to effectively respond.[30] The former CJCS General Colin Powell added during an interview on December 17, 2006 that "the active Army is about broken."[31]

Yet senior DoD officials continue to describe an acceptable (if not sustainable) level of risk, even describing ancillary benefits from current utilization profiles. This created what was described in Congressional testimony in 2008 by General Richard Cody as a "dichotomy of readiness."[32] General Cody described the U.S. Army as the "most battle-hardened, best-equipped, best-led, and best trained force for the counterinsurgency fight that we now face [but] unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack[ing] the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this world."[33] Overall, General Cody concluded that the Army was a "stress force but not a hollow force." USCENTCOM Deputy Director of Operations, Brigadier General Jack Egginton, likewise testified to being "extremely satisfied

[28] Ibid.

[29] Lawrence Korb, et al. "Beyond the Call of Duty: A Comprehensive Review of the Overuse of the Army in Iraq." Center for American Progress (CAP), August 2007. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/readiness_report.html (accessed February 19, 2012), 13.

[30] Ibid, 7.

[31] Ibid, 2.

[32] General Richard Cody. *The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces.* Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee of the 110 Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008.

[33] Ibid.

with the performance of the in-lieu-of forces."[34] The Navy and Air Force have both stated that their Services can sustain the current level of non-standard deployments, but "…not without causing strain on the force."[35] The Commander of USPACOM, Admiral Timothy Keating, in turn testified that in spite of resource shortfalls USPACOM is achieving "an acceptable balance"[36] with regard to dissuading, deterring and if necessary, defeating high-end adversaries. Even recruiting and retention, while a challenge in specific communities, has not shown the signs of a force at risk. Over the first half of fiscal year 2011, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Navy (USN) both met recruiting goals while the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) both exceeded their goals.[37]

Contextualizing Risk

That divergent assessments of risk exist should not be a surprise. After all, if the entirety of DoD agreed on both risk levels and the meaning or impact of that risk, then this thesis would instead be an historical survey of an effective risk management model. Yet the challenge remains that significant risk exists within DoD and there is not yet consensus on the near and long-term meaning of that risk, or a coherent and precise explanation of its source. So in order to further contextualize the risk and describe the impact of the GFM process and non-standard force demands on its accumulation, five areas of additional inquiry stand out: 1) What is the scale of the mismatch between the force that exists within the Service inventories and what is currently

[34] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Use of In Lieu of, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.* 110 Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 2007, 4.

[35] U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands.* GAO-08-670. Washington DC: GAO, May 2008, 4.

[36] Admiral Timothy Keating. *Statement on U.S. Pacific Command Posture.* Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 11, 2008, 14.

[37] United Press International. "Military meets recruiting, retention goals." United Press International. April 25, 2011. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/04/25/Military-meets-recruiting-retention-goals/UPI-51961303760407/#ixzz1iKtS0Ogi (accessed February 21, 2012).

being requested to fight the GWOT? 2) Is the risk uniform across the force? 3) Is the associated risk to this mismatch understood? 4) Is this just a phase? 5) Will a Service or DoD initiative correct this problem on its own?

What is the scale of the force mismatch?

Beginning with the question of scale, it is important to clarify the definition of non-standard forces. These relate to requests from combatant commands (CCMD) for a variety of *ad hoc* formations that are not otherwise planned and programmed for by the military departments. An example would be a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) or an Agribusiness Development Team.[38] For the purpose of this thesis and as characterized in a 2008 Government Accountability Office report, all individual-based augmentation requirements expressed by CCMDs are treated as non-standard,[39] as outside of collective training or equipping requirements, the military departments internally resource these requirements identically. Individual requirements are typically requested through the Joint Manning Document (JMD) process.

In terms of scale, the level of these un-programmed requirements has grown significantly in the past decade, though in aggregate, the level constitutes a fraction of overall demand. As of 2010, DoD reported a total of 24,000 military personnel filling these individual-based or *ad hoc* unit requests.[40] Relative to the total force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan reported in early 2011,

[38] 1st Lieutenant Lory Stevens. "Agriculture Team Trains Afghans on Grain Storage." American Forces Press Service. July 2, 2009. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54987 (accessed February 21, 2012).

[39] U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands.* GAO-08-670. Washington DC: GAO, May 2008, 7, 8.

[40] David R. Graham, et al. "Self-Selection as a Tool for Managing the Demands on Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel." Conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under contract for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness). Alexandria, VA: IDA, November 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA540829 (accessed February 19, 2012).

this would reflect approximately 17 percent.[41] U.S. Joint Forces Command reported that the total number of Service members serving in this capacity numbered 17,376 in 2008 and that this constituted less than 10 percent of the total forces allocated to CCMDs.[42] The Air Force testified that of their 25,453 airmen deployed to the USCENTCOM AOR in 2007, 6,293 were filling non-standard tasks, "mostly in lieu of Army specialists."[43] The Air Force also reported that since 2004, the non-standard taskings (including those that requested Army competencies but required the Air Force to retain existing personnel) had increased 33 percent annually, including 57 percent in 2007.[44] For purely individual based requests, the total requirements processed by DoD increased from 589 in November 2001 through 8,328 in May 2010, with a large spike in demand in the beginning of the decade, then gradual growth over time.[45]

Is the risk uniform across the force?

Still, DoD-wide numerical aggregation has limited ability to inform the scale of risk associated with non-standard demand as the 'load' is not even across grades and skills. HD/LD communities and the more senior ranks, particularly those for company, field grade and warrant officers and for non-commissioned officers (NCO) are impacted the most by non-standard demand. This was acknowledged in an Army Military Intelligence (MI) force re-balancing recommendation:

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[41] Moshe Schwartz. "Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis." Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 R40764. Washington DC: CRS, August 13, 2009.

[42] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Use of In Lieu of, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.* 110 Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 2007, 1, 74.

[43] Ibid, 7.

[44] Ibid, 7.

[45] Briefing slides with scripted commentary. "Joint Individual Augmentation Trend Line." Briefing slide capturing all global (DoD) Joint Individual Augmentee requirements from July 1, 2001 through April 30, 2010. Slide provided by Department of Army participant in the thesis survey on November 14, 2011.

> "Current Army MI Force structure is not optimized to provide core capabilities in support of [the] Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. Required intelligence core capabilities are not adequately reflected in the Army's MI organizational structures. This is evident in current operations where over 42% of the Army MI Forces deployed are fulfilling *ad hoc* JMD and RFF requirements, frequently employing non-program of record material for capabilities not found in today's formations… The current intelligence core capability gaps, the abundance of ad-hoc requirements, and extensive innovation to obtain non-program of record material solutions demonstrates that the MI Force is not optimized."[46]

Examples of imbalance are also reflected in the use of artillery, air defense and mechanized maneuver units to perform missions outside their designated competencies.[47] While these tasks—including security, civil affairs and military policing—may reflect standard military competencies, the inadequacy of the force to meet or sustain these operational requirements necessitated the temporary cross-training. As testified in 2010 by General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps:

> "the Marine Corps is tasked to fill a variety of assignments for forward-deployed staffs, training teams, and joint/coalition assignments that exceed our normal manning structures. The manning requirements for these uncompensated Individual Augments (IA), Training Teams (TT) and JMDs seek seasoned officers and staff noncommissioned officers because of their leadership, experience, and training. We understand that these augmentees and staff personnel are critical to continued success in Iraq and Afghanistan, but their extended absence has degraded home station readiness, full spectrum training, and unit cohesion. This has become most evident in our field grade ranks. In addition to the IA, TT, and JMD billets, emerging requirements associated with activation of USCYBERCOM, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program,U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and increased U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) support have compounded the demand for Marine majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels who would otherwise be assigned to key leadership positions in the operating force."[48]

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[46] Department of Army. "A Strategy to Rebalance the Army Military Intelligence Force." Brochure produced by Dept. of Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G-2. Washington DC: Department of Army, c. 2010. http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/G-2%20Vision/Documents/brochure_mi.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012).

[47] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces.* 111 Cong., 1st sess., April 22, 2009, 10.

[48] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *The Current Readiness of the U.S. Forces.* 111 Cong., 2nd sess., April 14, 2010, 14.

Is the mismatch risk understood?

Significant attention has been paid to the challenges of prosecuting a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism strategy with a force that was not built for this purpose. The military departments have made consistent progress in balancing the DoD program, both through doctrinal shifts as well as programmatic changes. In a 2011 testimony, it was reported that DoD has "realigned over 180,000 positions and has plans to realign roughly another 120,000 over the coming years."[49] Studies have been conducted on force planning factors, including the question of force mixes and the value of full-spectrum operation forces in the DoD inventory. Further studies have examined the impact of in-lieu-of (ILO) or *ad hoc* taskings on the force and defense officials have consistently testified to growing risk in this area, including in a hearing that was specifically scheduled to address this issue in 2007.[50] Nevertheless, as evidenced by steady increases in non-standard force requirements described in chapters three and four, the force re-balancing initiatives have yet to correct the base mismatch. The studies have also tended to either aggregate data at force-wide levels, which minimizes the unique strains within individual grades or communities, or focus on broader force planning issues that ultimately neglect near-term risk considerations. There is very little literature or scholarship at the unclassified level that relates to the procedural and execution aspects of the GFM allocation system or non-standard utilization over the past decade. Still, within the available research, evidence exists that the DoD may not comprehensively understand the risk assumed in allocation decisions associated with non-standard utilization and present force mismatches. As reported in a 2010 RAND study:

[49] Honorable Dennis M. McCarthy. "DoD Focus on Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Programs." Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington DC: U.S. Senate, May 4, 2011. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/McCarthy%2005-04-11.pdf (accessed February 19, 2012), 5.

[50] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Use of In Lieu of, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.* 110 Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 2007.

> "Air Force personnel raised two major concerns during interviews for this study. One was the difficulty in conveying to Air Force leadership—and to their counterparts in other services and on the Joint Staff—the current impact of joint sourcing assignments on individual career fields and the limited availability of personnel in some career fields for deployment. The second was the difficulty of expressing potential future impacts of agreeing to fill joint sourcing positions."[51]

A report commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 2010 highlighted these challenges by stating that "the demands on individuals filling these [non-standard] billets lack the management structure, including planning and demand forecasting, and discipline" that is available with standard force requirements.[52] The Headquarters Staff of the U.S. Army termed the accumulated aggregation of non-standard requests and the attendant impact on the force the "RFF death-spiral."[53] The Government Accounting Office (GAO) in 2008 reiterated the challenge of non-standard demand as well as the need for better management protocols:

> "The steps that DoD has taken to increase coordination between the services and CENTCOM have helped DoD manage challenges related to nonstandard forces, but additional steps are needed to ensure consistency in training and using these forces. Nonstandard forces face more complex relationships than standard forces, making coordination of their training and use more challenging."[54]

The RAND study best characterized the challenge of assessing incremental and dispersed risk in this context: "Thus, it may not be obvious that a unit is overstressed until the loss of one

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[51] John Ausink, et al. "Managing Air Force Joint Expeditionary Taskings in an Uncertain Environment." Conducted by RAND under sponsorship by the United States Air Force. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR808 (accessed February 22, 2012).

[52] David R. Graham, et al. "Self-Selection as a Tool for Managing the Demands on Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel." Conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under contract for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness). Alexandria, VA: IDA, November 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA540829 (accessed February 19, 2012).

[53] Department of Army. "A Strategy to Rebalance the Army Military Intelligence Force." Brochure produced by Dept. of Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G-2. Washington DC: Department of Army, c. 2010. http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/G-2%20Vision/Documents/brochure_mi.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012).

[54] U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands.* GAO-08-670. Washington DC: GAO, May 2008, 4.

more person to a deployment leads to some sort of mission failure. This breaking point is difficult to predict."[55]

Is this just a temporary phase?

With withdrawals from Iraq complete, further draw-downs in Afghanistan planned and no major operational or strategic breaks yet evident in the force, it could be assessed that documented risk notwithstanding, DoD weathered the force utilization patterns over the past decade by in effect temporarily balancing the force and overall risk levels in-stride. The 2010 QDR alluded to the strategic tradeoffs inherent within these decisions: "the Department's force planning assumes that over time forces can be redirected from most prevent-and-deter activities in order to meet more pressing operational needs."[56] Nevertheless, it is not clear that non-standard utilization patterns will recede to manageable levels. DoD testimony in 2011 assessed continued, elevated demand for many HD/LD capabilities, particular with the likely shift in emphasis towards security cooperation and building partner capacity missions.[57] Based on an empirical study in 2010, RAND determined that the use of Joint Task Forces (JTF), which on the basis of scalability and jointness are inherently non-standard force constructs, "…has been common over the past four decades but their use has increased over the past decade and the range of situations they have been called on to deal with has widened."[58] RAND concluded that

[55] John Ausink, et al. "Managing Air Force Joint Expeditionary Taskings in an Uncertain Environment." Conducted by RAND under sponsorship by the United States Air Force. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR808 (accessed February 22, 2012).

[56] Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.* Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington DC: February 2010.

[57] Honorable Dennis M. McCarthy. "DoD Focus on Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Programs." Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington DC: U.S. Senate, May 4, 2011. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/McCarthy%2005-04-11.pdf (accessed February 19, 2012), 6.

[58] Timothy Bonds, et al. "Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG675 (accessed February 22, 2012), xiv.

the increasing duration of deployments suggests that these headquarters were in fact not temporary and that the overall demand for these JTFs was "likely to remain high."[59] Future challenges may also influence the supply and demand balance in unpredictable ways. That is, while the aggregate number of allocation-based contingency forces requested by CCMDs may decrease, it is yet to be seen how force or budget cuts will impact the supply side of the equation.

A critical additional component to the question of whether this is just a phase of extraordinary force utilization is how the DoD has ultimately responded. As described in a study conducted on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, regardless of whether this was or was not an extraordinary phase, DoD appears to have treated it as just that:

> "An underlying cause of these procedural shortfalls in managing unprogrammed billets is that they are managed as though the 'war will end next year.' Hence, a systematic management process has not emerged. Although most of these billets, once established, can be expected to generate a demand to be filled on an ongoing basis, they are not formally requested beyond a year at a time and the requirement typically is not programmed into the structure of the provider organizations. These unprogrammed billets exist outside of doctrinally defined Service units; they serve to round out Joint headquarters staffs or to perform non-doctrinal tasks, such as serving on training teams, security detachments, Provincial Reconstruction Teams or providing 'in-lieu-of' manpower. Because these billets are unprogrammed, they do not fit within the Services normal force management practices."[60]

Will an established initiative mitigate these challenges?

Finally, it is worth examining whether any current initiatives may address either the systemic flaws or resultant risk of the current GFM allocation system. For the purpose of this section, risk-based approaches focus on short-term remedies to identified problems, while

[59] Ibid.

[60] David R. Graham, et al. "Self-Selection as a Tool for Managing the Demands on Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel." Conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under contract for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness). Alexandria, VA: IDA, November 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA540829 (accessed February 19, 2012), 30.

systemic solutions fundamentally reshape the force or an aspect of the management model in order to address those same challenges.

In terms of short-term remedies, the Services and the department have implemented a variety of initiatives aimed at either responding to the force mismatches inherent in the capability demand profile associated with the GWOT or in addressing the aggregate shortfalls of forces available to prosecute these efforts. While not an exhaustive list, the following steps are representative of the types of approaches that have been used to mitigate shortfalls and mismatches. At the broadest level, DoD was authorized by Congress for a temporary increase in the end strength of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, the two Services most deeply impacted by the GWOT. The U.S. Army was authorized to grow by 96,200 while the USMC was authorized to grow by 27,000.[61] As of 2012, both of these increases are in the process of being eliminated, though were essential at the time in order to "…reduce stress on the force, limit and eventually end the practice of stop-loss, and to increase troops' home station dwell time."[62] In particular for the U.S. Army, they were also critical in improving its ability to deploy units to combat manned at a minimum of the 95 percent level.[63] Due to its involuntary nature, "stop loss" is frequently referred to as a "backdoor draft"[64] in that it retains personnel beyond original enlistment contracts. As of 2008 there were still over 12,000 military personnel actively being

[61] General Peter W. Chiarelli. *Statement on Readiness of the United States Army*. Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness, July 26, 2011.

[62] U.S. Secretary of Defense. *Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee*, as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. February 17, 2011. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/02%20February/Gates%2002-17-11.pdf (accessed February 22, 2011), 2.

[63] Department of Army/Stand-To!. "Temporary End-Strength Increase." Department of Army, July 24, 2009. http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2009/07/24/ (accessed February 22, 2012).

[64] Charles A. Henning. "U.S. Military Stop Loss Program: Key Questions and Answers." Congressional Research Service, April 7, 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520802.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012)..

extended by DoD through the stop loss policy,[65] though the practice was ended by January 2010.[66] A related approach was the temporary use of 15-month tours by the U.S. Army in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility, which were instituted by extending units already deployed to those locations or revising the orders of soon-to-deploy units.[67] Bookends to the involuntary "stop loss" and tour-extension approaches were a variety of voluntary retention initiatives that sought the same result through financial compensation or other incentives.

In concert with the faltering economy, the 40 percent real increase in compensation for military members since 1999 is seen as one factor in improving overall retention rates.[68] The U.S. Army also significantly increased enlistment and retention bonuses during the past decade. From 2000 through 2005, re-enlistment bonus costs rose from $105 million to $506 million.[69] On the recruiting front, the Army was the Service that encountered the greatest difficulty in meeting recruitment goals, though this was likely exacerbated by the parallel growth in the size of the Army. The Army mitigated these challenges through a combination of financial and administrative measures. From 2000 through 2005, enlistment bonus costs rose from $135 million to $366 million.[70] Between 1999 and 2008, the percentage of soldiers receiving

[65] Ibid, 9.

[66] Department of Defense. "End to Stop Loss Announced." Department of Defense, March 18, 2009, No. 179-09. http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12564 (accessed February 22, 2012).

[67] Charles A. Henning. "U.S. Military Stop Loss Program: Key Questions and Answers." Congressional Research Service, April 7, 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520802.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012), 6.

[68] Todd Harrison. "Impact of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on the US Military's Plans, Programs and Budgets." Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009. http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/08.12.2009-Impact-of-Wars.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012), 8.

[69] Ibid, 10.

[70] Ibid, 10.

enlistment bonuses increased from 20 percent to 70 percent, peaking in 2005 above 80 percent.[71] The size of the bonus increased over the same period, averaging in the beginning under $10,000 per person, peaking at over $22,000 in fiscal year 2007 and resting at just under $20,000 in 2008.[72] Other Services demonstrated some of these same trends, though in the case of the U.S. Navy, while the average bonus size has increased during the same period, the percentage of recruits receiving bonuses has largely receded to pre-9/11 levels.[73]

From an administrative perspective, the Army responded to a decrease in the surge of high-quality applicants in the 2003-2004 timeframe by accessing a greater number of recruits with lower entrance scores. By 2007, in spite of rapidly increasing bonuses, the share of recruits with high school degrees dropped to 79 percent, the lowest level in 25 years.[74] To compensate for shortages in specific grades—a factor exacerbated by increases to end-strength, the modularization of the Army and non-standard demand that disproportionately drew on more senior ranks—the Army also significantly increased promotion rates. As a case in point, the 1997 promotion rate to Major and Lieutenant Colonel in the Army was 75 and 60 percent respectively. Both of these rates increased to over 90 percent by 2007.[75]

In a similar way, the increased use of contractors also represented the fundamental essence of both an inadequately sized and improperly aligned force, with its output not fundamentally different from Service efforts to create more capacity or different skills through

[71] Beth J. Asch, et al. "Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG950. (accessed February 22, 2012), Ch.2, p.7.

[72] Ibid, Ch2, p.8.

[73] Ibid, Ch2, p.12.

[74] Todd Harrison. "Impact of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on the US Military's Plans, Programs and Budgets." Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009. http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/08.12.2009-Impact-of-Wars.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012), 5.

[75] Ibid, 6.

accession, retention and force conversion policies. That is, the absence of meeting the aggregate, technical or functional needs inherent in wartime demand has compelled a reliance on seeking near-term relief through contractual, non-governmental support. These contractors, ranging from host-country personnel to third-country-nationals to U.S. civilians, constituted nearly 50 percent of all U.S. provisioned personnel in the USCENTCOM AOR by March 2010. In total, this represented approximately 250,000 contractors.[76]

Still, each of these initiatives or policies represented temporary fixes to existing imbalances. From a longer-term or more systemic perspective, the most promising initiative, the Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI), has been in development since 2003 and seeks to remedy a series of gaps in decision-level data associated with each of the three major components of the GFM process (assignment, allocation and apportionment). GFM DI will dynamically correlate all authorized DoD units and billets with personnel and readiness information. On the basis of being able to characterize authorization, assignment and readiness levels and link each of these to assignments, allocations and apportionments, GFM DI will allow for nearly instantaneous decision-support metrics and visualizations of where risk is being assumed and where allocation capacity may exist DoD-wide. While not eliminating risk in itself, GFM DI will significantly improve DoD's ability to characterize it. Still, continuing data compatibility standards and funding challenges have delayed completion of GFM DI and a baseline allocation decision support capability is unlikely before 2016.[77]

[76] Moshe Schwartz. "Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis." Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 R40764. Washington DC: CRS, August 13, 2009, 1.

[77] Major Brian Balazs. E-mail message to author, from staff officer currently assigned to Joint Chiefs of Staff J-8. January 6, 2012.

Continued reshaping of the force in order to "improve the 'fit' between programmed forces and the demands that may be placed on them in future operations"[78] also may minimize or correct this core problem. The U.S. Army proposed military intelligence (MI) rebalancing initiative is one example, where Army MI capabilities would be structurally prioritized towards lower echelon units, which is more consistent with current demand profiles and on the basis of additional MI assets at these echelons, potentially reduce the need for many of the additional non-standard add-on capabilities.[79] Still, predicting the character of future conflict is never precise,[80] and in any case, military organizations are rarely proficient at adapting themselves in ways that contradict their own preconceptions.[81] Secretary of Defense Robert Gates alluded to the failure of organizations to adapt long after identifying problems and possible solutions, drawing on insights catalogued by Robert Komer, a former colleague of his during the Vietnam conflict. These bureaucratic tendencies that prevent institutions from adapting include "a reluctance to change preferred ways of functioning, the attempt to run a war with a peacetime management structure and peacetime practices, a belief that the current set of problems either was an aberration or would soon be over, and the tendency for problems that did not fit organizations' inherited structures and preferences to fall through the cracks."[82] Secretary Gates continued that his fundamental concern was that "there is not commensurate institutional

[78] Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.* Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington DC: February 2010, 17.

[79] Department of Army. "A Strategy to Rebalance the Army Military Intelligence Force." Brochure produced by Dept. of Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G-2. Washington DC: Department of Army, c. 2010. http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/G-2%20Vision/Documents/brochure_mi.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012).

[80] Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.* Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington DC: February 2010, 42.

[81] Williamson Murray. *Military Adaptation in War.* Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). IDA Paper P-4452. Alexandria, VA: IDA, September 18, 2009. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/ona_murray_adapt_in_war.pdf (accessed February 23, 2012), 1-27.

[82] Secretary Robert M. Gates. "A balanced strategy: Reprogramming the pentagon for a new age." Foreign Affairs, Vol.88, No.1. January – February 2009, 28.

support—including in the Pentagon—for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors."[83] Perhaps exacerbated by drawdown decisions in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the possibility of shrinking defense budgets, these fears seem to already be taking root in future force planning, where the Services may be re-focusing on core competencies at the expense of the non-standard capabilities critical to the past decade. As former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan recently wrote, the re-focus on core-competencies "is code for 'conventional warfare.' This thinking will eliminate many of the programs that emerged as essential to success in irregular warfare. It is based in the misguided notion that we simply won't 'do' large scale, irregular warfare any more."[84] Consequently, while modest force re-alignments may continue, comprehensive programmatic or doctrinal solutions to the challenge of force mismatches is unlikely in the near term.

[83] Ibid, 28.

[84] General (Ret) Gordon Sullivan and Nick Dowling. "Why Are We Preparing to Fight the Wrong War – Again?" Fox News Corporation. December 22, 2011. http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/12/22/why-are-preparing-to-fight-wrong-war-again/ (accessed February 23, 2012).

CHAPTER 4

Surveying the Forensics of GFM-based Risk to the Force

First, find out what happened. Then, establish a chain of causation. Finally, apply critical judgment.[1]

- Sir Michael Howard

Insofar as Department of Defense (DoD) risk was demonstrably linked to wartime utilization patterns in chapter three, extant reporting fails to meaningfully inform the comparative role that non-standard force demands had on overall risk. Further, imprecise or non-existent causal linkages within the documented sources prevent identifying the role that process-design may have contributed to current risk. The combination of these factors suggests an inadequate foundational understanding of risk within DoD. In order to explore the foundation of this risk, this chapter will rely on the survey-based insights and perspectives of uniformed and civilian officers with significant experience supporting the allocation decision-making process within the global force management (GFM) system. These practitioners represent two of the three key stakeholder equities within the process—personnel or capability provision (Military Services) and risk management (the Joint Staff). While the combatant commands (CCMD), as originators and 'end-users' of augmentation demand, represent an important third element within this dynamic, the primary focus of the thesis is on the risk inherent within DoD meeting the overall crisis demand signal. As such, while assessing DoD's satisfaction of the augmentation demand on the end-user's terms is an important area of study, a core working assumption of the thesis is that the allocation requests are largely being met and the critical remaining question is, at what cost?

[1] Sir Michael Howard. *Captain Professor: A Life in War and Peace.* London, UK: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006, 130.

In order to assess the question of 'cost' or DoD-impact, this chapter addresses three distinct areas. The first two, drawing on survey responses, provides an empirical examination of current risk based on non-standard force demands as well as causal linkages between types of force demand. The third section synthesizes empirical evidence and provides an analysis of how organizational perceptions of process design and risk may exacerbate existing challenges. That is, if organizations have differing opinions on the source and nature of allocation-based risk, those organizations would likely have different views of whether or how to respond to those challenges. Through this tiered approach, the chapter explores the direct impact of non-standard force utilization, assesses the role that process-design may have had on current risk and postulate whether differing organizational perspectives on risk and process effectiveness may impede future initiatives to re-engineer the allocation process.

Finally, unless otherwise specified, the entirety of data and cited perspectives offered in this chapter are drawn from the survey conducted for this thesis between November and December 2011. As described in chapter two, individual participants were assigned numerical identifiers in order to ensure their anonymity as well as freedom to express frank views that may conflict with formal organizational positions on related issues. Each citation will reference the aforementioned survey, and in the cases where individual perspectives are being offered, an organizational identifier and a numerical designation reflecting the specific participant.

Non-Standard Risk Explored

As a starting point, the survey solicited input from current or recent GFM practitioners in order explore the impact of non-standard force demands on the Department of Defense. Beyond the benefits of disaggregating or clarifying the broad risk factors discussed in chapter three, this

inquiry also served the critical function of probing more deeply into the direct impacts of non-standard force utilization seen by day-to-day managers within this process.

A key theme highlighted by Military Service headquarter respondents was the variance between the ranks and skills requested through non-standard demand and the actual structure of their Service manning. As a first order effect, this resulted in select pockets of ranks and skills being disproportionately impacted by this type of demand, with second and third order effects dependent on the scale of demand, the ease of mitigating that risk or how those decrements impact the units or missions that normally rely on those ranks and grades. The Army highlighted the institutional and operational unit impacts based on the senior-grade nature of most non-standard demand.[2] The Marine Corps amplified on this, stating that the combatant command (CCMD) non-standard augmentation requirements "…are disproportionately for higher grades and low density skill sets which results in an uneven 'personnel tax' on the Services" and at the unit level, readiness levels "suffer as a result of [the] seniority of individual manpower required."[3] Directly based on this, the Marine Corps noted that all three of the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) were reporting[4] either C-3 or C-4 readiness ratings.[5] The Air Force

[2] Survey, U.S. Army, Participant #012

[3] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

[4] Department of Navy/United States Marine Corps/Marine Forces Command. "Talking Paper: OSD Recommendation to Task Other Services' with Sourcing Augmentation Requirements Identified by U.S. Navy as Adaptive Core and Non-Core." Internal staff memo prepared by U.S. Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) and provided by thesis survey participant as an addendum to submitted survey response. October 2010.

[5] Under the DoD's Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), C-3 reflects that a "unit can undertake major portions of its wartime missions" and C-4 reflects that the unit "requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its wartime missions, but if the situation dictates, it may be required to undertake portions of the missions with resources on hand." C-1 would represent full capability, C-2 that the unit could undertake the bulk of its wartime missions and C-5 that the unit is "not prepared to undertake its wartime missions." See Gebicke, Mark E. *Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness.* Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and testimony provided to the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on National Security. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107. Washington DC: GAO, March 11, 1997.

expanded on the second-order effects resulting from the types of 'leadership taxes' associated with non-standard demand:

> "The repeat deployments of mid level intelligence personnel [E5-E7 and O3-O4] have had detrimental impacts on the quality of training, leadership (discipline/ mentoring) received by junior personnel [E2-E4 and O1-O2]. A unit or Service would be hard pressed to show a specific impact for one mid level leader deploying, but the cumulative impact of mid level personnel being deployed will have a dramatic negative influence for years to come. The junior personnel have limited technical experts to show them the ropes or give them history or share experiences from previous units so the junior personnel's only frame of reference is the one from their current, i.e. first base. That leads to an overall decrease in technical and mission readiness. My experience as the senior intel officer at a flying unit was the situation above led to having an O2 and E4 as section leads responsible for training O1s and E3s on providing intelligence."[6]

As described above, resourcing non-standard force requests has both quantifiable and less quantifiable aspects, though both can ultimately impact Service core competencies, numbered war plan execution and force readiness. This may in fact lie at the heart of the challenge of understanding the impacts of non-standard force demands. According to a J3 respondent:

> "The Services can express institutional risk but they can not accurately predict what impact sourcing these requirements will have to their long-term health (retention, training, mission gaps, etc). This becomes a significant issue when units (Services) are cross-trained and assigned to missions they do not typically perform or are outside their normal MOS duties. An example would be Air Force enlisted Spanish linguists (occupational speciality 1A8) from Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) units being continuously assigned to non-linguist requirements in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Operations."[7]

The Air Force highlighted this specific issue, showing how non-standard demand tends to erode Service core competencies, with the effects reverberating well after satisfying the requisite deployments:

> "The demand for 1A8X2, airborne SIGINT sensor operator, out-strips the inventory the Air Force currently has in this [Air Force Specialty]. To satisfy the

[6] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

[7] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #020

> demand, the Air Force has been using 1A8X1s, airborne cryptologic linguist, for these requirements. This was an unacceptable solution to the Air Force because the cryptologic linguists lose valuable language skills while on these non-language specific deployments. The demand is so high [that] these linguists were being used repeatedly, leading to a nearly year-long re-qualification period for them to get back to mission ready status to fly on their primary platform."[8]

Service respondents highlighted additional second and third order effects of non-standard demand. The Army noted "degraded readiness in reserve component (RC) maneuver units prior to deployments because (individual, non-unit-based) RC volunteers have dwell issues from individual augmentee (IA) deployments. Extreme ad-hoc demand on low density/high demand (LD/HD) military occupational specialties (MOS) that are already below 60 percent fill Army-wide creates 'broken' specialties. In-lieu-of (ILO) solutions (create) risk in (impacted) skill sets."[9]

Other risk factors were seen by Service managers simply on the basis of preparing personnel to perform non-standard missions. The Air Force noted that "just-in-time readiness is applied to (the) majority of predeployment training" for non-standard requests,[10] which in itself leaves no margin for late-developing problems (e.g. personal issues, etc.). The Marine Corps described how non-standard requirements can impact both the supported and supporting commands by poorly preparing personnel assigned to these units. These non-standard units tend to lack the comparative levels of organizational refinement and mission essential task lists (METL) which the Services use to develop training regimens for standard missions and this "thereby increase[es] risk to personnel who are assigned."[11] The Marine Corps added that in the context of 'crisis sourcing' within GFM, traditional deployment preparation information is not

[8] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #016

[9] Survey, U.S. Army, Participant #011

[10] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #016

[11] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

coordinated by the requesting combatant command, leaving issues like lead Service for training and equipping as open questions to be resolved during execution.[12] In addition, by their very nature, *ad hoc* organizations typically do not have supporting infrastructure like combat service support and dedicated family support programs that standard units and commands would have, nor are these *ad hoc* organizations able to capture lessons learned in the same way that Services are able to for standard units and missions.[13] Further, the "deployment of individuals causes significant extra effort when utilizing current systems (i.e. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System) that were designed to deploy units and are built for deploying groups on a prescribed timeline."[14]

An additional effect of this type of non-standard demand is that these are unfunded requirements and unless paid for through temporary measures like Congressional supplemental appropriation bills, they draw resources from other funded requirements. Funding was important in that the "loss of [supplemental Congressional] funding will lead to fewer reservists being mobilized who would have brought some measure of relief to the active component."[15] The Air Force described how "a significant portion of the training and equipping [for non-standard forces] is tied to [supplemental] funding and availability of Army training schools."[16] These factors add complexity to administrative management functions, further stress the institutional base and create additional challenges with a "just-in-time" personnel model. Finally, the Marine

[12] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

[13] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

[14] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

[15] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

[16] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #016

Corps saw the management process as fundamentally damaging in that it "lumps all Services into a resource pool, regardless of organizational structure or mission."[17]

From an operational perspective, the Marine Corps described how non-standard demand seeks personnel of the same skill and grade as assigned to standard Marine formations. Consequently, "*ad hoc* formations are created by separating personnel with specific skill sets from operational units to meet a non-standard requirement."[18] Similarly, the Army added that manning for non-standard requirements primarily was derived through "lower manning assigned to the institutional or training base and operational support activities."[19] The Marine Corps is then "…challenged to balance the acceptable risks (less than 90% of tables of organization units) between combatant commander's non-standard RFF's and Joint Manning Documents (JMD); both compete for the same resources that are already allocated."[20] In the end, this tends to increase "risks to the U.S. Marine Corps and the unit commander" on the ground.[21] The Army reinforced that the operational effects are multiplied in that every Service member allocated against a non-standard requirement is a "direct decrement of three individuals from a combat or generating force unit (one deploying/one dwell/one preparing to deploy)."[22]

Other operational impacts extend beyond simply the deployed gaining commands. As stated by the J3:

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[17] Department of Navy/United States Marine Corps/Marine Forces Command. "Talking Paper: OSD Recommendation to Task Other Services' with Sourcing Augmentation Requirements Identified by U.S. Navy as Adaptive Core and Non-Core." Internal staff memo prepared by U.S. Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) and provided by thesis survey participant as an addendum to submitted survey response. October 2010.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Survey, U.S. Army, Participant #011

[20] Department of Navy/United States Marine Corps/Marine Forces Command. "Talking Paper: OSD Recommendation to Task Other Services' with Sourcing Augmentation Requirements Identified by U.S. Navy as Adaptive Core and Non-Core." Internal staff memo prepared by U.S. Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) and provided by thesis survey participant as an addendum to submitted survey response. October 2010.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Survey, U.S. Army, Participant #011

> "The GFM system does not appear to provide adequate balance to the existing requirements/obligations within other Geographical CCMDs… or other (Combat Support) Agencies. The system seems to benefit the CCMD executing a war vice assisting those CCMDs attempting to deter conflict. I think AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM and EUCOM are good examples of this issue. They do not typically receive additional sourcing support outside of units already assigned to their subordinate Service commands."[23]

The Air Force reinforced this point, describing how postured conventional forces are frequently used to fill non-standard requests.[24] Broadly speaking, these types of decrements directly impact other global missions and geographic combatant commands. To this point, the J1 stated that the the "Services are filling these (non-standard) requirements from personnel that would otherwise be filling permanent billets… While the Services would best be able to provide statistics demonstrating this effect, anecdotally, it seems to be having a negative impact."[25] This was further amplified by the Air Force, where the impact is registered through the availability of forces otherwise assigned to other CCMDs. With respect to these personnel or forces that would otherwise perform key headquarters functions and so-called "Phase Zero" missions:

> "The Services are playing a form of a shell game where a unit (especially reachback) with several different capabilities they are trained on are advertised to combatant commanders as 'available' for reachback. The combatant commands then look at the manning and capability and believe that the reachback can be exclusively dedicated to their requirement when in reality that unit has a long list of customers requiring one or another of those advertised capabilities. The capacity is just not there. A second version of the shell game is when combatant commands demand and services allow units to deploy an un-specified/un-quantified portion of that reachback without decreasing their stated reachback capacity. That is unidentified risk that the SecDef, CCMDs, and Services have not clearly identified and articulated."[26]

[23] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #020

[24] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #016

[25] Survey, Joint Staff J1, Participant #030

[26] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

Nevertheless, a minority of Service respondents felt that the risk being assumed was less related to non-standard demand than it was to other factors. One Air Force staff member best represented this position by stating that the overall tempo of operations over the past decade was the primary source of readiness challenges, not the nature of demand:

> "Flying units have experienced a significant decline in readiness largely driven by two factors: 1) limited dwell periods which have disrupted training base for helo, airlift, and some fighter units; 2) increased/protracted OPTEMPO & utilization rates have exceeded programmed life cycles for numerous weapon systems and accelerating maintain cycles and parts compensation/utilization."[27]

The same Air Force officer continued that this was ultimately a force sufficiency challenge, exacerbated by the "additional pre-deployment training requirement for non-traditional taskings," that were most deeply impacting the Air Force.[28] Even so, the official rates tracking these utilizations patterns across the Air Force "has been steady since [approximately] 2006, and [is] now declining with the end of [Operation New Dawn]. The USAF's JIA rate has grown consistent with other Services."[29] Most other Service respondents disagreed with this view, though. According to the Marine Corps, the trend line of non-standard requirements "…is increasing based on evolving missions where fewer large units are needed and more and more disaggregated personnel requirements are being generated."[30] One factor in divergent views between and across Services may be that individual grades or communities are impacted more deeply than others, a pattern that is largely hidden within larger aggregate statistics.

It is also critical to note that based on survey responses, the Joint Staff J3 statistically was far less inclined to view non-standard demand as a determining factor in the accrual of risk.

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[27] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #013

[28] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #013

[29] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #013

[30] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

These results, along with related perspectives from Services headquarters, will be explored in-depth in the next section.

Causality: Assessing How Process Design Impacts Risk

As detailed in, in Congressional testimony[31] and in other extant reporting described in chapter three, survey responses also showed that non-standard demand is overwhelmingly viewed as a key source of risk to the force by military Service representatives. Conversely, based on survey responses, the Joint Staff J3 perceives less of a causal linkage between overall risk and non-standard demand, at least in demonstrating a comparatively stronger correlation than standard-force requests. This is best represented by a J3 respondent who noted that there is "no real distinction in how the allocation decision making process works for standard versus non-standard requests in regard to risk decision making."[32] But before focusing on comparative organizational perspectives, this section will first expand on the base assessments of risk causality from each key stakeholder group. As a general precept, the responses in the narrative below were generally selected as representational of the metrics-based distributions from their source groups.

In evaluating the overall comparative effectiveness of the allocation system, the Marine Corps noted that "as a general rule, [Department of Defense] force management policies are better suited to manage and allocate pre-organized, [table of organization] organizations. Most of the systems in use are designed toward this end."[33] The Air Force added that the process for risk

[31] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *The Use of In Lieu of, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.* 110 Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 2007.

[32] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

[33] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

assessment is "much better… and can be quantified" for standard force requests.[34] The J3 agreed with the Services on the standard force requests, stating that "it is fairly straight forward to characterize risk for standard units since we have known quantities and known demands. We can fairly quickly assess where the standard units are in the force generation models and assess the risk to sourcing."[35] But for non-standard requests, the J3 deviated from the Services, acknowledging that the assessment process "is not an exact science and [it] is still marginally more difficult to assess sourcing risk for non-standard solutions."[36] The same J3 respondent even felt that the process for assessing risk for non-standard requests had improved in recent years:

> "At this time, I think we can do a pretty good job at articulating the types of risk factors for non-standard sourcing. I would not have said this back in 2007-2009. However, since we did a lot of (non-standard) sourcing during that time and we now better understand the impacts on the standard force which ultimately provides the *ad hoc* solutions, I think we/Services can better articulate the impact on the manning side of the equation."[37]

Importantly, the Services generally disputed that the risk assessment process for non-standard force requests is now working well or even comparable to standard requests. The Navy offered that because non-standard sourcing "…was incremental, often asking for 1 or 2 sailors at a time, the overall impact of each RFF is difficult to quantify."[38] In the same vein, the Air Force added that "the Services are incapable of showing the impact of 'just one more' at the individual level."[39] This, the Air Force felt, was exacerbated as the Service attempted to show the "impact of one individual across an entire pool of personnel, especially when the requirement in theater is

[34] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

[35] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

[36] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

[37] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

[38] Survey, U.S. Navy, Participant #015

[39] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

often 'soft' and the skill-set or grade is often waived."[40] The Marine Corps expanded on this, noting how the inherent tension a Service must manage in assigning personnel across the force based on primary skill sets, but often being requested capabilities through non-standard requests that only correspond to non-primary skill sets.[41]

These types of challenges in fact seem to lie at the core of divergent assessments between the J3 and Services: that the Services continue to identify second and third order effects of non-standard force requests across their respective forces, yet for a variety of reasons, these factors are either not visible to the J3 during the sourcing process or are not decisive in convincing senior DoD leaders to not assume risk in these areas. In essence, the Services describe a spider-web of impacts, quantifiable and unquantifiable, direct and indirect, understood and unpredictable. Yet the "RFF death spiral"[42] has continued apace as non-standard demand increased over the past decade, often in small increments that defy simple risk characterizations. As described by the Air Force:

> "Traditionally the Services haven't been effective in quantifying/articulating the institutional risk associated with those decisions. It's the same challenge the Services have traditionally experienced in trying to "predict/project" future readiness. The nature of emergent requirements exacerbates the challenge. How does a Service articulate the risk in providing three more O4s in a Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank? It isn't the three personnel… the issue is the cumulative demand isn't sustainable."[43]

These cases highlight a process that is ineffectively designed to manage this type of elevated and sustained demand. Still, it is worth noting that a portion of the challenge is based on how a Service fills non-standard demands, which itself is largely hidden to the Joint Staff during

[40] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

[41] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

[42] Department of Army. "A Strategy to Rebalance the Army Military Intelligence Force." Brochure produced by Dept. of Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G-2. Washington DC: Department of Army, c. 2010. http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/G-2%20Vision/Documents/brochure_mi.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012).

[43] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #013

the allocation decision process. That is, force-wide risk tends to be characterized in large aggregate numbers, while impacts are distributed across the force, with the individual risk at each location unique based on countless factors (ranks, specialties, size of impacted organization, duration of deployment, personalities, billets, etc.). The Navy described how non-standard requirements are sourced by the Navy by "undermann[ing] standing units" and generally following Service availability policies based on the affected populations (e.g. maintaining ninety-percent manning in afloat units, seventy-five percent manning at shore installations).[44] The Air Force described at length how this works in practice for their Service:

> "The USAF has implemented a policy of "X banding" the Institutional Force (IF). Twenty percent of the IF will be deployed at any one time. In theory, this provides headquarters eighty percent of their manning, gives predictability to individuals, and fills IA billets (normally deployed headquarters) with HQ-experienced personnel. The challenge for the USAF has been that if the [Air Force] HQ is only manned at sixty percent, deploying twenty percent of that drops the HQ down to forty-eight percent manning. The other issue is that with 179 day deployments being the norm, the actual predictability for many members on two-year tours is not very high and individual shops may get hit hard as several personnel end up on overlapping 6 month rotations. Another issue for the USAF is that 365 day deployments are tasked by the PCS Assignments team vs the Deployments team but the 365 will override the intent for predictability in the X band process."[45]

An Army respondent perhaps best articulated the spiraling impact of non-standard demands on both the operational and institutional forces, showing impacts that either are not included in discrete sourcing decision briefs or can even be fully understood in the near-term:

> "By sourcing individuals you are either breaking units or taking from the institutional base to fill ad-hoc/individual requirements. Initially what was surprising to me is requestors did not realize the [personnel] to support ad-hoc RFFs and JMDs came from the same sourcing pool. By taking from operational units you are rendering those units ineffective. [An] excellent example is the recent Security Force Assistance Team requirements. This required the Army to use the leadership from 4 [Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)] which rendered those

[44] Survey, U.S. Navy, Participant #015

[45] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

> BCTs ineffective. A greater impact is the majority of *ad-hoc* and JMD requirements are for field grade and senior [non-commissioned officers] which further stresses the force. [An] example is Security Transition Team sourcing. Each team consisted of 48 personnel (24 field grade officers, 24 Senior NCOs). Army is currently sourcing ten of these (480 personnel)."[46]

Similarly, the Marine Corps has interpreted non-standard force requirements as effectively directing the Services to "take from existing structure" in order to meet the non-standard requirement. This, the Marine Corps concluded, "is a fallacy [as] it threatens the institution as currently organized and authorized, it creates enduring requirements that have no end date and are not reviewed for relevancy regardless of length…."[47]

Yet independent of whether the J3 views targeted decrements from across other permanent billets as an appropriate outcome in the context of meeting wartime augmentation demands, the J3 respondents tended to believe that drawing from operational and institutional accounts in order to fill non-standard force requests was a Service-originated policy that the Joint Staff does not manage. As the Joint Staff J1 stated, "J1 does not track the 'how' a Service sources a requirement. We are aware that most Services base on [individual] community pools [across the] whole of Service."[48] The J1 added that "We have an inherent expectation that there are gaps in permanent manning"[49] based on non-standard demand and "this can result in units operating under strength as joint individual augmentees (JIA) by their nature are temporary unfunded, un-programmed positions."[50] Most J3 respondents added that this practice of selectively gapping or drawing from non-specified permanent requirements should in fact be an

[46] Survey, U.S. Army, Participant #012

[47] Department of Navy/United States Marine Corps/Marine Forces Command. "Talking Paper: OSD Recommendation to Task Other Services' with Sourcing Augmentation Requirements Identified by U.S. Navy as Adaptive Core and Non-Core." Internal staff memo prepared by U.S. Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) and provided by thesis survey participant as an addendum to submitted survey response. October 2010.

[48] Survey, Joint Staff J1, Participant #031

[49] Survey, Joint Staff J1, Participant #031

[50] Survey, Joint Staff J1, Participant #030

authority held by the Joint Staff or the Secretary of Defense: "The Services (supply side) should be agnostic. This is inherently the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's [CJCS] responsibility to adjudicate competing demand. The CJCS should establish [permanent] fill rates for Combat Support Agencies and Combatant Command staffs, just like [for] Joint Manning Documents."[51] Another J3 respondent expanded on this point:

> "The Services should provide the required personnel to the non-Service retained commands/agencies. The numbers should be accurately tracked and reported to the JS J3 and any [Requests for Forces] RFF sent to the Services that could be sourced via personnel assigned outside the Services should be mentioned in the Service [formal response]. The JS J3 should then negotiate release of personnel for these missions and de-conflict what is currently being provided. Regardless of how this eventually gets resolved, personnel need to be tracked in a standard, codified manner to reduce redundancy/duplicative sourcing."[52]

Yet to the Services, the practice of drawing from these accounts has been the natural consequence of the Joint Staff rejecting Service risk assessments, even in the cases where the Services have been able to effectively marshal a clearer picture of risk and global impacts. The Army concluded that until the last year, the "Joint Staff has had very little interest understanding the risk. I am not sure if OSD is aware."[53] The Air Force added that:

> "No matter how well the services characterize the risk, Joint Staff and senior leaders continue to [focus on aggregate numbers] and go against the recommendation of the experts […] who know how many people are postured. This disregards the fact that the personnel may in fact be engaged in supporting the combatant command from home-station (e.g. intelligence personnel doing direct support on unmanned aerial vehicle lines). There are just over 700 active duty personnel available to fill approximately 1,200 worldwide intel deployment requirements per deployment cycle. Reserve and Guard contribute an additional 40 to help fill these requirements. Seven-hundred and forty people to fill 1,200 leaves approximately 460 validated requirements without personnel to fill. Yet even when showing where every single intel person is employed and how they are

[51] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #023

[52] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #020

[53] Survey, U.S. Army, Participant #012

> supporting CCMD requirements from home, senior leaders continue to force us to source requirements we don't have the people for."[54]

In describing their concerns with the allocation system, two key management challenges were highlighted: risk assessments and prioritization. Both were seen as being exacerbated by but not unique to non-standard demand alone. In terms of risk assessments, an Air Force officer noted that "risk comparison is very challenging but it must be done. As someone told me, my job is not to say 'no' to a deployment request but to tell the general officers the mission impacts of saying yes."[55] This, the Air Force continued, is complicated by the fact that the structure of the force—both within and across Services—does not lend itself to standard risk metrics.

> "Until there is more standardization of accepted definitions, types of units, showing what units are actually doing, a true status of Active, Guard, and Reserve units, the state of GFM will remain confusing and not based on real risk. [Unique Service policies based on their own respective inventories] are not reconcilable and the GFM process currently has no way to show the nuance and true risk. There needs to be a DoD standard based on the type of unit it is and what its [operation plan] requirements are versus reachback versus deployed, etc."[56]

The discussion of risk in this context then bridges to the issue of prioritization, where without effective means of assessing risk, it is not possible to effectively prioritize the force either globally or within a specific activity. The Air Force noted that concerning intelligence forces (personnel or capabilities), "it isn't a sourcing issue, it's a prioritization challenge. CENTCOM has all of the intel forces the Services, CCMDs and Combat Support Agencies can provide. The challenge is getting CENTCOM to prioritize its own demand and constrain its internal task organization around the size of that allocated force pool."[57] The Joint Staff J1 concluded that "There is little balancing of sourcing between RFF and existing JIA requirements.

[54] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #016

[55] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

[56] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

[57] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #013

Efforts to design a process to best distribute emergent JMD and *ad hoc* requirements have fallen by the wayside."[58] The impact, in the form of risk, then transfers outside the requesting CCMD to a separate institutional or operational activity. The J3 acknowledged that other units across the force "…have suffered significant degradation in capability because personnel and equipment are continuously stripped away to cover ad-hoc or JMD requirements."[59] The risk could also be assumed in the form of a separate CCMD not actually having all of the assigned or apportioned forces available in the event of a crisis. One respondent noted that "the area here that needs the most improvement is the deconfliction between OPLAN 'on call' units who do or don't deploy and how that risk is quantified."[60] The J3 reinforced this perspective, though offered the qualifier that even if this were indeed a design flaw, these types of risk tradeoffs are inherent in the very nature of context where demand exceeds the available supply:

> "The system is designed to examine risk and do all of these fairly well with the exception of the contingency numbered OPLANs and contingency plans with [deployment data]. However, even in the later case, the SecDef and CJCS made/make strategic and military risk calculations of the likelihood and consequences of the various contingency possibilities. Even if the GFM allocation process was perfect now, we simply don't have enough forces to meet all the current demands and maintain a standing contingency force. This is not the fault of the allocation system, rather the reality of our nation's ability and will to maintain forces."[61]

Organizational perspectives

Given the consolidated inputs from these GFM practitioners, the final area of examination relates to how comparatively these perspectives may inform a deeper understanding of the role of non-standard demand and procedural considerations on risk. This area is critical in

[58] Survey, Joint Staff J1, Participant #032

[59] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #020

[60] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #010

[61] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

that divergent perceptions between Service 'suppliers' and Joint Staff 'managers' of either risk causality or risk levels can prevent corrective actions from being taken. This comparative analysis also lies at the heart of the assessment of whether the DoD's force management process is adequately designed to manage risk and resources for non-standard requests. That is, while Service and Joint Staff stakeholders within the GFM process agree that risk is being accrued in aggregate across the force, base perceptions of process design impacts can demonstrate how stakeholders formulate these differing perspectives on causality and how or whether they believe the symptoms merit a remedy. In the end, the differing perceptions on these causal linkages can also inform how the Joint Staff may in fact overlook or undervalue factors associated with non-standard demand.

As detailed in earlier sections, the Services tend to overwhelmingly correlate the management of non-standard force requests to accrued Service or DoD risk. Figure 6, consolidating responses from Service members, reinforces this view, showing a delta between the perceived effectiveness of the process managing standard and non-standard force requests. On average, Service members viewed the GFM system as being relatively ineffective at managing non-standard demand (3.1 on a 10 point scale, with 10 being the most efficient, 1 being the least efficient); while fairly effective (7.7 on the same scale) for standard requests.



Figure 6: Military Service respondents' perspectives on the effectiveness of the allocation system in managing standard and non-standard demand.

Conversely, the Joint Staff J3 deviated significantly from the military service assessment of process efficiency, though before detailing this, it is important to note the methodological differences between how the survey postulated this question to the Services and the Joint Staff J3. For the Services, the question sought a single consolidated assessment of process effectiveness in managing risk for both standard and non-standard demand. For the Joint Staff J3, given its overall management role in the process, the survey divided these identical risk categories into five sub-components. These five components, identical for both standard and non-standard demand, asked for the J3 assessment of the allocation system balancing risk or prioritizing between: other standing DoD missions; Service institutional factors; potential future contingencies; other personnel or capabilities already allocated; or between competing units and individual augmentee (IA) requirements. While these methodological approaches do not lend themselves to direct statistical comparison, they produce analogous assessments of the same base process of managing risk for standard or no-standard requests, while helping to inform the J3's assessment of comparative strength and weakness of each. With that context and as depicted in Figure 7, on the same 10 point scale used by the Services, the average JS J3 response across all risk sub-



Figure 7: Aggregated responses depicting JS J3's assessment of the GFM system's ability to balance five types of DoD risk when allocating standard or non-standard forces.

components assessed that the GFM system was modestly effective at managing standard force requests (5.8) and slightly less effective at managing non-standard force demands (4.9).

This was also borne out in a later question (see Figure 8), where the J3 assessed that the GFM allocation system was only marginally clearer in managing standard-demand requests (1.8 on a 5 point scale, where a score of 2 reflected "risk for standard requests was marginally clearer" and 1 reflected "risk for standard requests was significantly clearer").



Figure 8: JS J3's assessment of DoD's comparative ability to characterize sourcing risk for standard unit-based allocation requests & non-standard requests.

The J3 assessment deviated from the Service perspective on two key levels, while generally reinforcing a third. In terms of congruence between Service and J3 responses, the J3 likewise assessed the GFM process as being more effective in managing standard than non-standard requests. In terms of deviation between the Service and J3 responses, the J3 tended to lack the intensity of positive or negative opinions concerning the process. As depicted in Figure 7, the average J3 assessment of process effectiveness in managing standard requests was 5.8, while the average score for non-standard requests was 4.9. Equally important, the J3 assessed a much smaller difference in overall process efficiency between standard or non-standard requests. While the Service responses created a wide 'book-end' effect between standard and non-standard

requests, the J3 responses were both grouped relatively closely to the middle, reflecting only minor variance in the J3's view of the effectiveness of the process to manage each.[62]



Figure 9: Service respondents' perspective on the trend line of non-standard requirements sourced by their Service over time.

Another core area of divergence related to the assessment of the historic trend lines of non-standard demand. As shown in Figure 9, the Services tended to view that there was a 'significant/large increase' in non-standard force demands (4.2 on a 5 point scale). One Service respondent noted that the Air Force "has experienced a significant increase in non-traditional demand,"[63] while the Marine Corps added that "*ad hoc* solutions are becoming more the norm, illustrating that senior leadership fails to grasp the pitfalls associated with creating new units from 'whole cloth'."[64] The Army added that non-standard demand "has always been high," though noting that the so-called force management level in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility in practice contributed to the skewing in this direction: "this is further impacted

[62] It should be noted that one J3 respondent consistently expressed outlier perspectives. Nevertheless, excluding that outlier data only marginally adjusted average scores (.69 for standard and .5 for non-standard). Neither of these resultant differences fundamentally altered the consolidated assessments, and as such, the outlier data was retained.

[63] Survey, U.S. Air Force, Participant #013

[64] Survey, U.S. Marine Corps, Participant #014

by the establishment Force Management Levels (FML) for both Iraq and Afghanistan.[65] In many cases instead of deleting (standard) units to achieve the FML, commanders chose to send portions of units home. This move created more ad-hoc requirements."[66]

As depicted in Figure 10, the J3 expressed a different view, assessing that the trend line corresponded to 'no significant change' (3.4 on a 5 point scale), though a plurality of respondents assessed a 'small/modest' increase in non-standard unit request. One respondent conceded growth in recent years, but felt that these would soon recede: "there was a fairly significant increase in non-standard requests year on year up through FY10, but FY11 and FY12 seem to have leveled off and I believe FY13 will show modest declines."[67] The J3 also stressed that as a percentage of the overall force, the non-standard force demands were relatively low: "however, all these [non-standard requirement] numbers are a small overall percentage of the total force allocation requirement."[68] The same J3 respondent also felt that it was ultimately a matter of perception: "the non-standard requests appear to be large because the number of requests seems



Figure 10: Joint Staff J3 assessment of the trend lines of non-standard unit requests over time.

[65] "Force management level" (FML) refers to the SecDef managed number of total uniformed service members operationally assigned to USCENTCOM in each respective country. For Afghanistan, this number was re-baselined following the Presidential approval of 33,000 additional troops in 2009. See Department of Defense. "Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan." Report to Congress in accordance with 2008 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Washington DC: DoD, November 2010.

[66] Survey, U.S. Army, Participant #012

[67] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

[68] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

to be comparatively large to the standard requests; and even though the total number of non-standard [personnel] is small, they are painful for the Services to fill."[69]

Empirical Conclusions

Based on these factors, several key themes can be seen with respect to divergence in Service and the Joint Staff J3 view of risk and process effectiveness. Overall and building on feedback discussed in this chapter, the J3 tends to view aggregate risk at lower levels than the Services. Within this risk, the J3 sees only minor differences in the effectiveness of the allocation process in managing standard or non-standard requests, while the Services see a significant difference in the two. The Services overwhelmingly associate non-standard requests as a major contributor to aggregate risk, though as described in the text-based responses, acknowledge difficulty in articulating this risk to the Joint Staff. This likely contributes to the related view from the Joint Staff, where the J3 acknowledges that it does not have a clear view of how Services are filling standard or non-standard demand (i.e. indirect impacts with other missions or commands). Finally, the J3 tended to view the trend line of non-standard demand as growing at a significantly lower rate than the Services' assessment.

From this, the following conclusion can be drawn simply based on comparative perceptions between the management lead for the allocation system—the Joint Staff J3—and the force provider element of the system, the military Services: if the J3 does not believe there is a significant difference between the effectiveness of the GFM process in managing standard or non-standard requests, then it follows that the J3 would not associate aggregate risk (chapters three and four) with being either a non-standard demand or a process problem. That is, the process in the J3 view is more-or-less as effective for one form of demand as another so

[69] Survey, Joint Staff J3, Participant #021

aggregate risk is more a function of OPTEMPO and overall demand (e.g. simultaneously supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) than of the nature of demand or the capacity of the process to manage different types. A second point is that the intensity of Service views countering the J3 perspective suggests merit in the notion that non-standard demand is in fact disproportionately responsible for the aggregate risk seen today; and that the process contributes to the aggregation of risk in this area in that it does not facilitate insight to that risk by the management component of the process, the J3. This conclusion then forms the basis for the recommendation presented in chapter six, though prior to proceeding to that point, the next chapter will briefly examine whether the types of risks and wartime manpower challenges seen today are unique to the post 9/11 era or the current allocation decision model.

CHAPTER 5

The Stretched or Broken Force through an Historic Lens

We have learned through painful experience that the wars we fight are seldom the wars that we would have planned. [1]

-Quadrennial Defense Review 2010

Mark Twain once wrote that "no occurrence is sole and solitary, but is merely a repetition of a thing which has happened before, and perhaps often."[2] This adage is no less true in the case of managing the force, as many of the phenomena described earlier have occurred in previous times. Briefly reviewing these can provide insights into the risk being assumed today, not as a comparative assessment of management models, but rather in linking contemporary phenomena to earlier events and offering important historical context to the holistic examination. Rather than minimizing the correlation between the new GFM system and persistent force management challenges, these historical analogues instead reinforce the timeless character of these problems, their impact on DoD and the continuing need to develop a system that can better address these recurring dilemmas. The framework for this review will take broad groupings of various phenomena identified earlier in the thesis, then highlight historical examples of the same as well as both historical and current remedies to these challenges. It is important to note that while most of the historical examples occurred during wartime, others occurred amid budget cuts, interwar years or defense draw-downs. Each of the described remedies represented temporary fixes to problems associated with the availability, capability or capacity of military forces and, importantly, none of these were unique to the force management models contemporary to those

[1] Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.* Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington DC: February 2010, 42.

[2] Mark Twain. *The Jumping Frog.* New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1903, 64.

events. Instead, these disparate historical examples demonstrate the value of a procedural remedy to recurring challenges that neither disappear when conflict recedes nor become irrelevant when additional forces are rapidly generated through other means like the military reserves, conscription or contractors. The four groupings, some with modest overlap, will include: force mismatches; operational force shortfalls; budget cuts; and readiness hedges.

Force Mismatches

It is perhaps an article of faith that Americans never fight doctrinally, as is it an accepted reality today that the planned and programmed force did not accurately anticipate the proper balance and mix of capabilities requested to fight in the so-called global war on terror (GWOT). At their core, these force mismatches embody the difference between the anticipated future and the actual future, while associated management approaches dictate how those differences are brought into conformance and how risk is mitigated through the process. Just as they are evident in the earlier cited examples from chapter three of converting airmen into ground support or field artillerymen into military police, force mismatches and the challenge of making in-stride changes are hardly new in American history. During World War II (WWII), the inventory of personnel grew to be deeply out of balance, with the primary shortfall being junior infantrymen due to heavy casualties in those ranks. For a variety of practical and political reasons, the War Department dictated that the shortfalls needed to be treated as a 'load balancing' problem from within the existing authorized strength rather than as justification for increasing the number of draftees in order to produce more infantrymen through the draft.[3] Consequently, the bulk of these shortfalls were met by converting personnel from other skill categories, beginning with non-infantry combat arms (field artillery, tank destroyer, anti-aircraft), then drawing from the

[3] Roland G. Ruppenthal. "Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume II, September 1944-May 1945." Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1959, 304.

'physically capable' segments of other theater over-strength and general assignment personnel. The general assignment group included a significant number of supply personnel as well as those otherwise serving in the U.S. Army Air Corps. In total, tens of thousands of personnel were converted through this process.[4] This effect is a mirror of current practices that re-train U.S. Air Force or U.S. Navy personnel in order to perform non-standard functions in a ground war environment.

During WWII, the U.S. Army also made the doctrinal change of reducing the number of infantry privates in table of organization units,[5] which in effect represented another means of affecting this overall re-balancing of forces in theater by drawing, at a net aggregate level, personnel that would otherwise have been directed to non-infantry missions into infantry units. Other personnel were simply cross-leveled from standing missions such as operational supply functions or attaché duty[6] in order to meet the most critical emergent needs of the war, again a close parallel to documented cross-leveling practices today. The same approach was employed during the Vietnam War, wherein experienced servicemembers were drawn from across the force to serve in counterinsurgency, advisory or missions otherwise outside their trained field.[7]

Not only were these historical practices viewed as sub-optimal at the time, they also led to direct mission impacts. For example, in a 1947 issue of *Marine Corps Gazette*, one writer noted that integration of replacements such as was inherent in the issues identified above or more

[4] Ibid., 304-320.

[5] Ibid., 310.

[6] William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus. *The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany*. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1965, 15, 408-409.

[7] John A. Nagl. "INSTITUTIONALIZING ADAPTATION: Its Time for an Army Advisor Command." *Military Review* 88, no. 5 (2008): 21-6, http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/225302365?accountid=12686. (accessed February 29, 2012), 22-23.

generally through the individual replacement system, "…did not lead to increased momentum in the attack, but had a vicious effect on the cycle of casualties."[8] Other studies described how the use and integration of individual replacements into standing units engaged in combat operations led to increased rates of casualties in WWII, Korea and Vietnam.[9] Another example of mission impacts of managing force mismatches came from the Commanding General of the Advance Section, Communications Zone in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). In his case, the General noted that the impact of personnel conversion activities degraded the efficiency of his supply units by nearly 20 percent.[10] Simple logic suggests that this type of risk was broadly manifest across the many impacted organizations, with mission areas losing personnel experiencing diminished performance levels, while the gaining organizations were challenged with integrating recent trainees. This effect during the Vietnam War led to the infamous moniker of "FNG" for the *f***ing new guy* who struggled to adapt to and be accepted by an established unit.[11] Beyond the relational factors of unit cohesion, these types of policies tended to "lessen fighting power and make casualties more likely."[12] It also should be noted that the policies for how mismatches are corrected with individuals and units can equally impact outcomes. That is, the individual replacement system, used in various forms since at least the Civil War and kept in

[8] Robert E. Cushman. 1947. Battle replacements. *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 31, no. 11: 46-50, http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/206290543?accountid=12686.

[9] James Dunnigan. The World War II Bookshelf. Compendium summarizing multiple books, including "The American Soldier" by S.A. Stouffer, et al. New York: Citadel Press, 2004, 232.

[10] William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus. *The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany*. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1965, 408-409.

[11] Mark DePu. "Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy." Weider History Group's Historynet.com. November 13, 2006. http://www.historynet.com/vietnam-war-the-individual-rotation-policy.htm (accessed February 28, 2012).

[12] Mackubin T. Owens. "Will This War Ruin the Army?" Ashland University's Ashbrook Center. July 2005. http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/owens/05/army.html (accessed February 26, 2012).

place through the Vietnam War, was used to realign both force shortfalls and force mismatches.[13] While this system "assured combat outfits a kind of formal immortality,"[14] the costs of this approach were well documented. In essence, the individual replacement system kept combat units on the front lines indefinitely, only replacing casualties or in later wars, personnel that had fulfilled their combat tour. This in effect treated soldiers as "interchangeable spare parts" and individual replacements as "a class of supply to be managed in the same way as any other class of supply."[15] The result was demonstrably higher casualties and lower performance.[16]

Force Shortfalls

History also demonstrates the common practice of increasing the size of the military to respond to the latest conflict, based on the recognition that the standing force is inadequate to meet contingency requirements. Aggregate insufficiency can be dealt with many ways, including through growing the size of the force or in implementing various management schemes to at least temporarily make more personnel or units available than otherwise would be available. Current methods of increasing the size of the force were described in chapter three. Historical means of achieving the same either match these approaches, or reproduce the same effect through related means. The 'industrial grade' approach to rapidly increasing the force is through the implementation of a draft, though this also the most politically fractious. Whereas the Armed Forces today have relied primarily on increasing recruitment through a combination of bonuses

[13] John S. Brown. 2007. Life-cycle manning. *Army* 57, no. 3: 132-132,134, http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/237088263?accountid=12686. (accessed February 26, 2012).

[14] Samuel A. Stouffer, et al. *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Volume 2, The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949, 243.

[15] John C.F. Tillson and Stevel L. Canby. "Alternative Approaches to Organizing, Training and Assessing Army and Marine Corps Units. Part I: The Active Component." Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). November 1992. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a261942.pdf (accessed February 28, 2012), III-9.

[16] Ibid, III-11.

and decreased standards, the majority of wartime increases over the past century in the U.S. were implemented through the military draft. Conscription is a time-honored tradition, going back to 558 B.C. with Darius I of Persia.[17] Others followed suit, especially in early years as empires were expanded and the modern draft traces back to Napoleonic France in the late 18th Century. In the U.S., state militias had been drawn on, particularly during the colonial days, the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, though the Civil War marked the first true use of the draft in American history, with both the North and South employing conscription as a means of building and sustaining their armies. The Korean Conflict ultimately relied on the draft for 1.5 million personnel, while nearly two million were drafted during the Vietnam War. World War II represented the single largest draft in the nation's history, ultimately accessing over 10 million personnel through this system.

Administrative methods for increasing available inventory are not unique to this era, either. As discussed in chapter three, a variety of programs used over the past 10 years more rapidly increased or sustained longer the inventory of available forces than otherwise assessed. These included stop loss, shortened training regimens, reduced accession standards, diminished recruitment or retention standards, increased tour durations, distorted promotion rates and heavy reliance on contractor support. Similar approaches have been used historically. During WWII, the War Department was able to expedite the provision of newly accessed troops to theater, but only by cutting two-weeks from training regimens.[18] Just as accession standards were relaxed

[17] Robbie Asher. "Draft or Volunteer Army: Our Nation's Best Interest." Texas University. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, January 4, 2008, Ch.I, pp.1-12.

[18] Roland G. Ruppenthal. "Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume II, September 1944-May 1945." Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1959, 325.

over the past decade, the same occurred as both WWI and WWII progressed.[19] So too was the case with promotion rates. During the Vietnam War, shortages in the noncommissioned officer ranks were mitigated by accelerated promotions. The result was the "widespread promotion of enlisted soldiers (often referred to as 'shake-and-bake' sergeants) unprepared to handle NCO responsibilities," which contributed to documented breakdowns in unit performance, order and discipline during the war.[20] Stop loss as a policy was unnecessary in the nation's largest conscription effort, where the terms of the draft in WWII became the 'duration of the war plus six months.'[21] Still, that WWII conscription was initially restricted to a single year of service then later extended draws a parallel to the policy of tour extensions in 2007.[22] Stop loss also draws earlier precedence, with it being first first employed in 1990 during the Gulf War, then later that decade in Bosnia and during the Kosovo Air Campaign.[23]

Reliance on conscription or administrative policies are not the only ways that the Armed Forces have compensated for shortfalls. Today, the reliance on contractors is so profound that many analysts assess DoD could not "successfully execute large missions without contractor support."[24] Just as was the case with conscription, though, this is hardly a new phenomenon. In

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[19] Ramy A. Mahmoud, et al. "Evolution of Military Recruit Succession Standards" In *Military Preventive Medicine: Mobilization and Deployment, Vol 1*. 149-150. Fort Detrick, MD: Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 2003.

[20] Andrew F. Krepinevich. "The Future of U.S. Ground Forces." Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 26, 2009. http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2009.03.26-The-Future-of-US-Ground-Forces.pdf (accessed February 26, 2012), 7.

[21] Terry A. Yon. "The Elimination of the Draft Registration: Military and Political Implications." U.S. Army War College (USAWC). Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, January 31, 1990. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a219775.pdf (accessed February 28, 2012), 9.

[22] Charles A. Henning. "U.S. Military Stop Loss Program: Key Questions and Answers." Congressional Research Service, April 7, 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520802.pdf (accessed February 22, 2012), 6.

[23] Ibid, 1.

[24] Moshe Schwartz. "Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis." Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 R40764. Washington DC: CRS, August 13, 2009, 1.

terms of U.S. history alone, the reliance on contractors extends as far back as 1777, when contractors were employed "to assist with the Delaware River defense… and to help dig siege fortifications in Savannah, Georgia two years later."[25] Due to overall force shortfalls, contractor labor was targeted towards "tasks deemed too menial for soldiers (e.g., transporting supplies) or overly specialized (such as surgeons and other specialized medical personnel)."[26] In every major subsequent U.S. campaign, contractors figured prominently.[27] The U.S. Army Balloon Corps during the Civil War was a fully contracted capability. The use of contractors significantly expanded during WWI and that expansion carried into WWII, where a combination of the technological sophistication of new systems as well as the primacy of diverting all available personnel to the war fronts expanded the manner in which contractors came to support the security establishment. During WWII, approximately 730,000 civilians supported the military, with the vast majority being constituted by foreign nationals. In general, the ratio of contractors to uniformed members continued to expand through Korea, Vietnam and into OIF and OEF. In each case, the cause was either directly or indirectly related to force insufficiency or force capabilities, whether as a technical matter, a priority of effort or a mismatch between doctrinal training and emergent missions. The increase of contractors during the Vietnam War, at the time called "War by Contract", was even directly tied to insufficiency, as President Lyndon Johnson's decision not to mobilize additional personnel tilted the emphasis even further towards contractor

[25] Richard Fontaine and John Nagl. "Contracting in Conflicts: The Path to Reform." Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Washington, DC: CNAS, June 2010. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Contracting%20in%20Conflicts_Fontaine%20Nagl.pdf (accessed February 26, 2012), 8.

[26] Ibid., 8.

[27] Ibid., 8-11.

reliance. It is also fair to note that the reliance on contractors tends to increase as the level of armed forces decreases, as was the case in the Balkans in the 1990s.[28]

Readiness Challenges

As documented in chapter three, the imperatives of executing two simultaneous major operations over the past decade resulted in declining readiness rates across the force, whether as it relates to material factors, individual training or Service competencies. These too have their historical precedence, with the classic case study in a failed readiness posture being Task Force (TF) Smith at the onset of the Korean Conflict. Just five years removed from WWII, this became the "classic example of an army facing battle totally unprepared,"[29] with the Eighth Army transitioning from a proven combat formation during WWII into a "colonial Army"[30] several years later as the traditional warfighting competencies atrophied. Mortars were not test fired, rifles were not zeroed, rifle companies were manned at less than 25 percent, critical combat support capabilities were stripped out of the active force, and in the case of the 24th Division in Japan, there was no opportunity to practice squad based maneuvers. These readiness factors were also consistent across the entire Army, with only a Division in Europe not being under-strength in all three of its regiments. TF Smith was deployed on short notice to the Korean Peninsula on 1

[28] U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans.* GAO-03-695. Washington DC: GAO, June 24, 2003, 8.

[29] Dale S. Marmion. "Korean War Outbreak: A Study in Unpreparedness." Military History Online, August 22, 2010. http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/korea/articles/studyinunpreparedness.aspx (accessed February 26, 2012).

[30] Roy K. Flint. "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950" In *America's First Battles: 1776-1965.* 266-299. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986, 266-274.

July 1950.[31] After suffering heavy casualties and giving "up more ground than it should have in nearly every engagement," TF Smith was withdrawn after just two weeks.[32]

Degraded readiness also served as a leading indicator to the so-called 'hollow forces' of the 1970s, where the force appeared strong on paper, but for material, training, manning or performance level inadequacies, was deemed 'hollow.'[33] For the Air Force, the "clearest symptoms were poor morale, inadequate flying hours, lack of spare parts, an exodus of highly trained personnel, and the inability to attract high quality recruits."[34] While retention remains strong in the U.S. Armed Forces, the cannibalization of experienced officers and NCOs from units today to fill non-standard requirements tends to operationally create a similar effect to simply the previous "exodus of highly trained personnel."[35] Likewise, the quasi-hollow forces of the 1990s followed the post Cold War draw-downs. Within this context, non-standard missions like peacekeeping in the Balkans and humanitarian missions further challenged the traditional competencies and structures of the Services, with the funds traditionally used to support training and equipment maintenance diverted to these unexpected operations.[36]

It is not an insignificant point that though not a symptom of operations today, hollow forces historically tend to follow the 'boom years' of wartime spending and force structure growth. As described in a Center for Analyses 1996 report, signs of hollow forces tend to "occur

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[31] Ibid., 276.

[32] Ibid., 266.

[33] Congressional Budget Office. "Trends in Selected Indicators of Military Readiness, 1980 through 1993." Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Papers, March 1994. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a474766.pdf (accessed February 28, 2012), 2.

[34] Daniel L. Cuda. "The Hollow Force that Was." Air Force Magazine, April 1994. http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/1994/April%201994/0494hollow.pdf (accessed February 26, 2012), 69.

[35] Ibid, 69.

[36] Andrew Feickert and Stephen Dagget. A Historical Perspective on 'Hollow Forces.' Congressional Research Service (CRS) 7-5700 R42334. Washington, DC: CRS, January 31, 2012, 11-12.

more often after periods of major downsizing. This was the case during the Interwar Years (1920s-1930s), the post-World War II period (1945-1950), and following Vietnam (1968-1975). Each time we downsized, a host of problems ensued—some we now consider classic readiness problems, but others were more closely linked to lack of force size and inadequate modernization efforts."[37] In this sense, while DoD will undoubtedly make every effort to prevent readiness challenges during future draw-downs, the symptoms of of a hollow force tend to follow these periods. As such, there will likely be historically consistent readiness pressures during the next draw-down, with those only exacerbating any existing readiness challenges. And as history has shown, degraded readiness tends to occur at inopportune times.

In conclusion, it is important to note that drawing historical parallels to current phenomena does not by itself minimize the importance of either current force management procedures or of unacceptable levels of risk. Instead, these echoes of the past provide valuable context in discerning the aggregate meaning of the risk factors that can be seen today.

[37] Matthew T. Robinson, et al. "Avoiding a Hollow Force: An Examination of Navy Readiness." Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) CRM 95-238. Alexandria, VA: CNA, April 1996. http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/Documents/avoiding_a_hollow_force.pdf (accessed February 26, 2012), 12.

CHAPTER 6

Recommendations

> *This is an aspect of military science which needs to be studied above all others in the Armed Forces: the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown. I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. . . . [I]t is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.* [1]
>
> *-Sir Michael Howard*

As demonstrated in previous chapters, the exigencies of war tend to expose the military to the risks inherent in quickly adapting the force to mitigate capability mismatches or shortfalls. These risks were first dileneated in chapter three, which drew on extant reports, Congressional testimony and formal Department of Defense (DoD) assessments. Through a survey-based approach, chapter four expanded on these risk and force utilization factors, then firmly established a positive relationship between non-standard force demands and DoD risk, while demonstrating a linkage between the aggregation of that risk and the underlying force allocation process. Finally, chapter five examined these risk and force utilization factors through an historical lens, including a discussion of remedies used in previous eras to mitigate some of the symptoms, shortfalls or breakdowns we see today. Nevertheless, these historical approaches have primarily been comprised of expedient and temporary solutions to discrete problems, not comprehensive remedies that as a starting point enable better decision making. Importantly, common to each era has been an incomplete understanding of the comprehensive risk associated

[1] Sir Michael Howard. *Military Science in the Age of Peace.* London: RUSI Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, March 1974, 7.

with these remedies. That is, even as these remedies have achieved the urgently desired effect (e.g. trained infantrymen during World War II), second and third order effects have been poorly understood or considered (e.g. higher casualty rates, lower unit performance, unexpected impacts to other global missions). In light of this, while acknowledging the value of symptoms-based remedies to the discrete problems identified in chapters three and four, history has also shown that not only are future conflicts unpredictable, but force management challenges are as well. The precise challenges of today will unlikely be the challenges during the next war. As such, the recommendation below posits a broader, systems-based approach that seeks to enhance the capacity of the current allocation process to effectively inform senior leaders' understanding of comprehensive risk, while not simply providing a laundry list of possible solutions for each problem that might be found later. Through a process design approach like this, DoD will gain greater transparency into unique problems as they occur, informing risk at that inflection point, guiding the formation of remedies from that point forward and aspiring to Howard's exhortation to not get it "too badly wrong" in the process.

Prior to describing this approach, it is important to note that three broad approaches towards better managing the friction inherent in force mismatches were considered by the author. 'Supply' approaches would focus on permanently converting the existing DoD inventory, and through programmatic means, reshape the force to more closely match the new 'non-standard' forms of combatant command (CCMD) demand. In essence, these supply-oriented approaches recognize the inherent purpose of the military departments to train, organize and equip forces with which CCMDs fight the nation's wars, with 'non-standard' demand being a manifestation of an existing disconnect within that relationship. It is widely acknowledged that this is an area that could be improved. As described in a 2003 Defense Science Board report, "First, the

business of the combatant commands is the department's core business and inability to relate resource allocations to core business should be regarded as a fundamental failure in how DoD understands its own business."[2] By transforming the existing DoD inventory to more closely match the new types of non-standard demand, the risk associated with temporary conversions would be reduced. Nevertheless, supply approaches are fundamentally reactive in nature and outside of remedies whereby individual sourcing 'reservoirs' were programmed into end-strength, these do not eviscerate the risk associated with the types of expedient solutions normally demanded in a crisis.

Second, 'demand' approaches would seek means of disciplining how CCMDs request forces, in essence asserting modest to significant limits on the CCMD's access to capabilities not resident in standard Service or DoD unit structure. Similar to supply-oriented approaches, demand approaches would likewise eliminate 'non-standard' demand, in this case by simply compelling CCMDs to only request units that exist within the DoD inventory. While not reactive like the supply-oriented approaches, demand approaches nevertheless tend to be inefficient, suggesting that CCMDs request full units, even if smaller components are all that are needed. Demand-oriented approaches also presume that all non-standard capabilities or missions loosely correspond to organizations within the force and those like-capabilities can be readily identified. Examples like agriculture development teams, provincial reconstruction teams or threat finance cells may demonstrate the inadequacy of purely demand-oriented approaches.

The third approach, which is applied below and forms the basis for the recommendation proposed in this thesis, corresponds to GFM process improvements. Notionally, this approach conceives of a decision process that does not prevent or solve second and third order effects, but

[2] Doctor Bob Hermann and Gen (Ret.) Larry Welch. "Enabling Joint Force Capabilities." Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics). August 2003. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA417886.pdf (accessed February 27, 2012), 17.

rather better characterizes these effects within the existing system, thereby better facilitating insight into departmental risk in the near and long-term. The foundation to this approach is for the Joint Staff to manage the force assignment process comparably to how the force allocation process is currently administered. That is, reviewing and analyzing annual Service assignment levels against all permanent manning responsibilities, ranging from combatant commands to the training base to defense agencies, then through the Global Force Management Board (GFMB), preparing a baseline recommendation to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in concert with the annual global allocation recommendation. In effect, this creates an annual starting point from which allocation distributions are established or contextualized, and importantly, this is done in



Figure 11: Rather than creating a separate process, the focus of this approach would be on characterizing the direct and indirect impacts of force allocations, beginning with an annual assignment and allocation baseline. That is, characterizing the impact of 75 percent manning in CCMD #1 or a maneuver unit slated for deployment and within the 'prepare to deploy' phase only being manned at 60 percent. In many respects, this would more closely align personnel/unit management with how Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are currently managed and allocated.

conjunction with an explicit decision acknowledging which missions, commands or activities are paying the direct or indirect bill for these allocations. Notionally, this is depicted in Figure 11, which first appeared in chapter one. This framework would not necessarily dictate how the Services choose to resource the aggregate allocation demand, though it would ensure that senior

leaders were fully aware of the indirect bill-payers, again creating a contextual starting point to understanding global risk. Three distinct steps would enable this approach, one which could be implemented almost immediately, the second in the near-term and the final step in the midterm. Each of these is detailed below.

The first step would be to direct that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J8) holistically monitor force utilization across all three aspects of GFM (allocation, apportionment, assignment), plus other Service manning obligations. These would include institutional requirements (e.g. training), joint or national requirements (e.g. defense agencies) and forces otherwise postured as reachback for other global missions (e.g. quick reaction forces, defense common ground stations, etc.). This approach would also assess how Services are meeting headquarter (HQ) and Service component obligations to other CCMDs in the same way that the GFM process currently does for allocations alone. At present, JCS J8 largely confines force sufficiency assessments to the allocation process (i.e. analyzing which requests were not filled by the Services). A broader approach would better characterize risk across the entire defense program by showing where risk is being assumed and whether existing trade-off decisions best

Summary: Improving the characterization of GFM-derived impacts across the force primarily through expanding the Joint Staff's 'force sufficiency' analysis to assigned and apportioned categories. Three implementation phases are included below:

- Immediate Implementation: Through the Global Force Management Board (GFMB), the Joint Staff presents 'assignment' and 'apportionment' baseline assessments and recommendations as part of the annual allocation recommendation to the SecDef.
- Near-Term Implementation: Expand reporting requirements for assets not typically accounted for through the GFM system (e.g. contractors, civilians, etc.) in order to provide improved context to subsequent allocation decisions.
- Mid-Term Implementation: Full operating capability for GFM DI, which will automate the data generation for the processes above and expand its utilization to crisis allocation requests.

Figure 12: Overview of Recommendation

balance comprehensive risk. That is, if Services are under-filling the forces-for units, CCMD HQs or defense agencies, how does that risk compare to the risk of allocating one more *ad hoc* unit to a CCMD? This approach would also enhance the Joint Staff's ability to assess whether apportioned forces were truly available or at an appropriate readiness level.

The next supporting task would be to expand DoD reporting to more comprehensively account for all DoD assets, including those not specifically managed through the GFM system.[3] At present, the GFM process is almost entirely focused on simply managing a segment of the uniformed military force, while not comprehensively taking into consideration assets already on hand (e.g. assigned forces, contractors, etc.) or assets that might be secured through other channels (e.g. personnel from combat support agencies, contractors, etc.) when making subsequent allocation decisions. Yet DoD resources, whether in the form of uniformed military personnel, federal civilians or contractors, all fill different aspects of the same aggregate operational or national security demand. By expanding the GFM process to take into account these separate manpower pools, DoD could better administer the totality of DoD resources, identifying the comparative best source for one capability, while importantly also having a clearer picture of which additional assets are currently on-hand. In short, it is unlikely that DoD could efficiently manage the force if a significant portion of capabilities exist, are administered and may in fact overlap with requests evaluated within the allocation process. By expanding GFM allocation decisions to include visibility of all DoD resources (civilian, contractors, Title

[3] It should be noted that some elements of DoD assets would not be directly managed through this process in the same way that Title 10 forces are managed. Those personnel falling outside those groups—predominantly military personnel funded under Title 50, federal civilians and contractors—would instead be centrally accounted for by the Joint Staff when making allocation decisions (e.g. 50 federal civilians concurrently on-hand at location X performing mission Y), but not directly allocated through the GFM process. Accounting for these personnel through the decision process would necessarily inform a more comprehensive understanding of risk and resources.

50 personnel, etc.), GFM allocation recommendations would then be informed by an holistic knowledge of all assets and resources and an appropriate balance for each.

The final supporting element, arguably the most critical, corresponds to enhanced decision support tools, or specifically a fully-functional GFM DI. Absent the types of decision support tools that can accurately generate a global 'scorecard' of DoD's satisfaction of standing obligations across all sectors, the ability of the Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense to accurately assess those obligations will remain limited, particularly as they relate to dynamic changes within the system. The author assesses that annual baseline assessments could be performed by the Joint Staff in conjunction with the Services, CCMDs and Defense Agencies, though dynamic updates to support risk-based decisions for crisis allocations would be highly manpower intensive absent adequate automation, likely making it impractical. GFM DI is currently projected to reach a capability comparable to what is described above as early as 2016, though given that the project was first initiated in 2003, significant senior attention and DoD resources need to be applied to ensure this program achieves its objectives.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

(This text) does not contain any magic formula to follow, nor does it offer any secret key to unlock the door to the Nation's manpower resources. Success comes only from the hard work of staff officers who apply sound principles to whatever immediate situation is under consideration. [1]

-Lieutenant Colonel Leonard L. Lerwill

Insofar as this thesis has concluded that the force management process is inadequately designed to manage risk and resources for non-standard demand, simply focusing on the procedural and administrative remedies proposed in the previous chapter will not by itself prevent the accumulation of departmental risk in the future. That is, purely procedural remedies minimize the importance of the staff that support the process, the impact of shifting priorities on decisions and the judgment of decision-makers within this framework. Further, it is not the intent of this thesis to create a framework where decisions are adversely biased against non-standard demand, thereby cutting out this segment of risk-producing requirements from combatant commands. To this point, it is neither the intent of this author to restrict operational commanders of the forces they require to prosecute future crises, nor this author's presumption that non-standard demand is fundamentally detrimental to the health of the force. And the recommendation offered in chapter six is consistent with that conclusion. Rather, this author views the nature of non-standard demand as intrinsic to the historical record of warfare and its presence a 'healthy' corrective to Service and departmental force planning and overall doctrinal adaptation. As such, instead of proposing a framework that essentially 'engineers away' non-standard demand from the system, the underlying intent of this thesis was to localize this key and

[1] Leonard L. Lerwill, ed. *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army.* Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-211. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1954, v.

recurring aspect of departmental risk,[2] establish its causal linkages and demonstrate the inadequacy of the current system to comprehensively inform senior leaders' understanding of the associated chain of causation and resultant risk. Enhancing the understanding of this otherwise poorly understood element of departmental risk and recommending an approach that would increase the transparency into this type of risk are two key objectives of this thesis. It would be a mistake to assume that as forces draw down in the Middle East, these challenges will simply disappear. Consequently, the core conclusion of this thesis is that global risk cannot be comprehensively managed without recognizing existing 'blind spots' created by non-standard demand within the system and ensuring that any future framework is designed to better characterize that 'hidden' risk during the decision process.

Left as an open question within this thesis is the role of policy and leadership within this decision making construct. That is, incomplete information challenges good decision-making, while comprehensive or enhanced information can improve our ability to manage risk. But inadvisable policies or judgments can act independent of process or information considerations. Yet this tension is fundamental to any organization, uniformed or civilian, and also lies at the heart of any discussion of civil-military relations. In the end, improved risk-management models can better frame decisions for key leaders, yet it is their judgment—and their ability to balance operational, institutional and political factors—that will always reconcile these often contradictory factors.

[2] As described in chapters three and four, examples of the risk 'hidden' by the current force management tools and procedures include impacts to Service competencies, risk to future execution of numbered war plans, degraded readiness in maneuver units prior to deployments, 'broken' specialties (e.g. airborne linguists), institutional factors (training base, retention, etc.), Phase Zero support to other geographic combatant commands or national agencies, and many other second or third order effects.

Appendix A: Survey Recruitment Letter

Dear (Survey Participant)

I am a graduate student at the Joint Forces Staff College and conducting research for my thesis entitled "Managing Non-Standard Force Demands: Risk Implications of the Global Force Management System."

I am writing to request your participation in a survey for my research project. I hope to gain valuable insights from individuals with significant experience with the Department of Defense's Global Force Management (GFM) system. Having supported the GFM process in the Pentagon since 2004, I've elected to write a thesis focusing on the effectiveness of the GFM system in managing operational and institutional risk for 'non-structural' (joint individual augmentation and *ad hoc* units) Combatant Command demand. My intent is to address this from a total-force perspective, not focusing on a single occupational specialty or functional area.

I would like to collect your input you via an email-based questionnaire that is estimated to take a minimum of 30-minutes to complete. Your participation in the survey is voluntary and will be anonymous in all written results. By completing and returning the questionnaire, you are consenting to participate in the study.

In order to contribute to this study, please return the survey to me at the email address below no later than 9 December 2011. In addition, if you are aware of any other Department of Defense employees/uniformed members with a comparable or greater level of experience or expertise in the area of global force management, please either forward this email to them or provide me their current contact information. Thank you in advance for your consideration and I look forward to your participation.

Appendix B: Survey Questionaire

SURVEY

MANAGING NON-STANDARD FORCE DEMANDS: RISK IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Instructions: Please fill out personnel data then only complete the section representing your principal organizational expertise / experience (e.g. Service headquarter staff personnel would fill out the "Military Service" section, Joint Staff J3 personnel would fill out the "Joint Staff J3" section). Many questions can be answered simply by 'checking' the appropriate box (e.g. replace the blank box with the letter "X"). If you have no input for a specific question, simply type "No Input." In some cases, supporting data/information (e.g. formal staff assessments of specific issues) may best answer the question. Any such releasable data (e.g. *ad hoc* or JIA force trends, Service impacts by specialty, etc.) for the purpose of developing this thesis would be greatly appreciated. There is no limit on the length of responses and all input will be anonymous, only generically attributed to a 'defense official' or officer from your organization (e.g. "Headquarters Department of Army" or the "Joint Staff J3"). The primary intent of this survey is to collect your perspective on the Global Force Management system, and as such, individual perspectives may conflict with established policy or doctrine. Once complete, email the completed form and any attachments to my NDU email address (james.wright@ndu.edu).

Finally, if you know of any colleagues whose experience or perspectives would be valuable to this research, please either forward the original email to them requesting their participation, or send me their contact information.

Name:			
Current Service	□ USA □ USN □ USAF □ USMC □ CIVILIAN □ CONTRACTOR □ Other: _____		
Current Pay Grade	□ O-4 □ O-5 □ O-6 □ GS-13 □ GS-14 □ GS-15 □ Other: _____		
Current Position Title and Organization		**Years in Position**	
GFM focused Position title, Grade & Org (if different from current)		**Years in Position**	20__ through 20__

Military Service (HQ or Service Component Command) Respondents

1) Specify the impacts on your Service that result from habitual sourcing of 'non-programmed' (*ad hoc, in-lieu-of* and Individual Augmentation) requirements over a multi-year period.

- *Quantification requested if available, to include unclassified/releasable supporting data prepared by your office/Service. Examples could include impacts to Service competencies, risk to future execution of numbered war plans, degraded readiness in maneuver units prior to deployments, 'broken' specialties, disproportionate impacts to specific grade bands, other institutional factors (in-resident PME, training base, retention, etc.), phase zero support to other geographic combatant commands or national agencies, etc.*

Response (no space limit):

2) What is the trend line of non-programmed Combatant Command capability requests (IA/*ad hoc*) sourced by your Service?

a) Note: Please respond using the scale below. In the text portion, provide the range of fiscal years referred to in your response along with any other amplifying information. Quantification requested if available, to include unclassified/releasable supporting data prepared by your office/Service.

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Significant/large decreases	Small/modest decreases	No significant change	Small/modest increases	Significant increases

3) Using the scale below, how effectively do current Joint Staff and OSD-level GFM policies, and procedures and practices facilitate senior defense leaders' understanding of the risk associated with the allocation of 'non-programmed' assets (IA and *ad hoc or in-lieu-of* units)?

- *Note: For example, when asked for one more civil affairs specialist, is the Service able to effectively characterize the aggregate institutional and operational risk of sourcing/not sourcing that requirement? Include amplifying information below as appropriate.*

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
1 (least effective)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (most effective)

4) Using the scale below, how effectively do current Joint Staff and OSD-level force management policies and procedures facilitate senior defense leaders' understanding of the risk associated with the allocation of 'programmed' assets (military table of organization or inventory-based units, etc.)?

a) *Note: Include amplifying information below as appropriate.*

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
1 (least effective)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (most effective)

5) If you rated the GFM system in Question #3 (IA/*ad hoc)* as being <u>comparatively less effective</u> than in Question #4 (programmed unit-based forces), how could, from your vantage point, the GFM system better quantify Service or Departmental risk in managing IA/ad hoc/in-lieu-of allocations?

Response (no space limit):

6) How does your Service typically derive sourcing solutions for *ad hoc* or IA requirements?

- *Note: For example, reserve component employment; use of billets specifically programmed for IA/ad hoc employment; lower manning assigned to the institutional or training base, Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies; deferred training opportunities; just-in-time readiness for deploying units; risk with operational support activities, etc.*

Response (no space limit):

7) Are there any future Service-generated initiatives to better align resources/structure/ programmed forces with the current allocation demand profile (e.g. rebalancing, carving out programmed billets that will be used for IA/*ad hoc* requests, etc.)?

- *Note: Context would be helpful. For example, re-alignment initiatives are estimated at reducing ~50% of current Service non-structural taskings.*

Response (no space limit):

8) How does your Service articulate risk associated with unit re-missioning (e.g. field artillery unit retrained for advise/assist or detention operations)? To what degree or has your Service identified degradation in core skills or competencies based on habitual re-missioning?

Response (no space limit):

9) Other Comments:

Joint Staff J3 Respondents

1) What is the current percentage of *ad hoc* capability requests from the Combatant Commands as a portion of overall requests and does this represent an increase, decrease, or steady state over a period of time?

a) Note: Please respond using the scale below and in the text portion indicate the time duration reflected in the assessment. It is requested that a minimum of 3 fiscal years are reflected in this response, though longer time frames would be helpful if the data is readily available.

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Significant/large decreases	Small/modest decreases	No significant change	Small/modest increases	Significant increases

2) Using the scale below, rate the Joint Staff's comparative ability to characterize sourcing risk for standard unit-based allocation requests (e.g. requests for table of organization units like Brigade Combat Teams) and non-standard requests (e.g. *ad hoc capabilities like Weapons Intelligence Teams or Provincial Reconstruction Teams).*

a) *Note: Characterization of risk at the Joint Force Coordinator level implies a comprehensive understanding of impacts to the supported and supporting commands/Services, as well as any other applicable risk factors (e.g. institutional, force management, global impacts, etc.). Please use text portion to amplify on response, including what you would attribute any comparative differences to.*

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Risk for standard requests is significantly clearer than for non-standard requests	Risk for standard requests is marginally clearer than for non-standard requests	No consistent difference in the availability of clear risk data between standard and non-standard requests	Risk for non-standard requests is marginally clearer than for standard requests	Risk for non-standard requests is significantly clearer than for standard requests

3) Using the scale below, indicate how frequently Combatant Command-validated requirements are rejected or significantly changed by the Joint Staff during the validation phase (i.e. excluding the sourcing phase). In the text portion, include the time window reflected in your response along with typical reasons for rejection/changes and whether rejection rates differ between standard and non-standard (*ad hoc)* requests.

a) *Note: Significant changes would materially change the original requirement (i.e. excluding administrative changes, minor adjustments to grades, etc.). "Rejection rates" need not be quantified through data compilation, but can be anecdotally quantified by expressing your experience using words such as "tends", "usually", "often", etc. Timeframe should cover a minimum of 3 fiscal years.*

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Never (0%)	Rarely (approx. 1-5%)	Occasionally (approx. 6-20%)	Frequently (approx. 21-40%)	Very Frequently (approx. 41-100%)

4) **How effectively does the GFM system balance rotational/emergent allocation requests for <u>standard force requests</u> (e.g. Brigade Combat Team, Carrier Strike Group, etc.) with the other missions/factors specified below?**

Response (no space limit):

GFM balancing risk between emergent/rotational allocation requirements and other standing, non-allocation based DoD missions (e.g. Phase Zero support to Combatant Commands, global posture, annual partnership building activities like exercises or theater security cooperation events, etc.):

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk between emergent/rotational requirements and Service institutional factors:

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk between emergent/rotational requirements and potential future contingencies (e.g. numbered plans):

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk/prioritizing between currently sourced requirements and emergent requests:

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk/prioritizing between unit based requests and individual augmentee requirements?

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

5) **How effectively does the GFM system balance rotational/emergent allocation requests for <u>non-standard force requests</u> (e.g. Weapons Intelligence Team, Provincial Reconstruction Team, etc.) with the other missions/factors specified below?**

Response (no space limit):

GFM balancing risk between emergent/rotational requirements and other standing DoD missions:

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk between emergent/rotational requirements and Service institutional factors:

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk between emergent/rotational requirements and potential future contingencies (e.g. numbered plans):

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk/prioritizing between currently sourced requirements and emergent requests:

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk/prioritizing between unit based requests and individual augmentee requirements?

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

6) From the JS J3 perspective, is it a Service-held authority to negotiate or institute lower fill rates at non-Service retained commands/agencies (such as Combat Support Agencies, Combatant Commands, etc.) in order to fill current GFM-based allocation demand? If not, where should this authority/management function reside?

Response (no space limit):

7) Using the scale below, how comprehensively are other resources like deployed DoD civilians, contractors or reachback support considered when making GFM allocation decisions?

a) *Note: For example, to what degree are these additional DoD capabilities explicitly considered during the comprehensive sourcing risk assessment?*

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐
Never / Extremely Rare	Infrequently	Commonly	Comprehensively

8) Is it possible for the Joint Staff to globally manage risk for personnel and capability allocations through the GFM system when a portion of DoD resources (DoD civilians, contractors, reachback support) exists largely outside the process and Combatant Commands have the ability to independently 'access or seek support from' each of those non-GFM bins as needed? If not, please provide amplifying comments.

Response (no space limit):

9) Other Comments:

Joint Staff J1 Respondents

1) **How effectively does the GFM system balance risk and prioritize between joint individual augmentee (JIA) requirements and the other missions/factors below?**

Response (no space limit):

GFM balancing risk between existing JIA requirements and unit based requirements (e.g. RFF)?

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

GFM balancing risk between currently sourced JIA requirements and emergent JIA requirements?

☐ 1 (not effective)	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10 (very effective)

2) Do Services fill JIA requirements with personnel from pools outside the Reserve Component and programmed/set-aside billets (e.g. Navy)? If so, how does the JS J1 perceive the Services are resourcing these JIA requirements (and does J1 have any statistics to demonstrate the scale of this effect)?

- *Note: For example, under-filling programmed billets, lower fill rates at COCOMs and Agencies, just-in-time unit manning, etc.*

Response (no space limit):

3) From the JS J1 perspective, is it a Service-held authority to negotiate or institute lower fill rates at non-Service retained commands/agencies (Combat Support Agencies, Combatant Commands, Service Components at Combatant Commands, etc.) in order to fill current GFM-based allocation demand? If not, where should this authority/management function reside?

Response (no space limit):

4) Using the scale below, how comprehensively are other resources like deployed DoD civilians, contractors or reachback support considered when making GFM allocation decisions for JIA requirements?

a) *Note: For example, to what degree are these additional deployed capabilities explicitly considered during the comprehensive sourcing risk assessment?*

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐
Never / Extremely Rare	Infrequently	Commonly	Comprehensively

5) Describe or quantitatively depict the growth, scale and number of validated Joint Task Force Headquarter elements managed through the GFM process between FY2002 and FY2011.

a) *Note: If statistics are unavailable, please describe broad trends in the reliance of Combatant Commands on Joint Manning Documents over the past decade as well as the key ranks or skills requested for these Headquarters.*

Response (no space limit):

6) Using the scale below, indicate the number of Joint Manning Document positions currently filled by a non-unit based solution (i.e. not billets sourced/filled by an Army Corps, etc.).

Response (no space limit):

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
<10%	11-25%	26-40%	41-60%	61-75%	76-90%	>90%

7) Other comments:

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VITA

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